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This paper studies an incomplete information coordination game with rationally inat-
tentive players. Coordination requires common knowledge among the players of the
payoffs. In practice, players may not be able to observe payoffs perfectly and so lack
such common knowledge. This imperfection could result from the complex nature of the
environment. The global game literature attempts to model this issue through allowing
players to receive private signals of payoffs while ￿xing the information structure. Ac-
cordingly researchers obtain a well-known limit uniqueness result (e.g. (Hans Carlsson
andEricvanDamme1993), (DavidM.Frankel, StephenMorrisandAdyPauzner2003)).
Our paper explores another model of the lack of common knowledge. Rather than equip-
ping players with exogenous signals, we allow them to acquire any information about the
payoffs. When information acquisition is costly, players have to focus on the information
most relevant to their welfare and be rationally inattentive to other aspects. This leads to
the issue of coordination with rational inattention. Thus, in this paper we mainly address
this question: what information is acquired in equilibrium and how does this information
acquisition affect coordination?
Throughout the paper, we use the following story to illustrate our idea. Two play-
ers coordinate in investing in a risky project. The project’s future cash ￿ow is driven
by a randomly ￿uctuating fundamental. Each player must decide whether to invest or
not, and her payoff depends on her opponent’s action as well as on the realized funda-
mental. Given her opponent’s action, a player’s payoff from investing increases in the
fundamental. Moreover, given any realization of the fundamental, a player’s gain from
’invest’ over ’not invest’ is strictly higher when her opponent also invests. Therefore,
players’ actions are strategic complements. Before making a decision, each player can
independently purchase private information about the fundamental in the form of an in-
formation structure, i.e., the conditional distribution of her signal given the fundamental.
She then takes action according to her realized signal. Since acquiring information is
costly and the bene￿t is bounded above, it is not optimal to collect all information about
the fundamental. Players have to decide what information to acquire.
There are two factors affecting players’ information acquisition strategy. The ￿rst oneVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 3
is the fundamental effect. Intuitively, given her opponent’s action, a player is willing
to collect information about the fundamental that helps her invest with high (low) prob-
ability in the high (low) states. The second but more interesting factor is the players’
consideration of their opponents’ information acquisition. Since my payoff depends on
your actions and your actions are motivated by your beliefs, upon receiving my signal,
I attempt to infer not only the fundamental, but also your signal, your beliefs about my
signal, your beliefs concerning my beliefs induced by my signal, and so on. This rea-
soning never stops and applies to both players, thus makes higher-order beliefs of all
orders relevant for both players’ decisions. Moreover, considering that these higher-
order beliefs are ultimately determined by their information acquired, both players have
an incentive to match each other’s informational choice to minimize the probability of
miscoordination. In other words, each player is willing to pay attention to the events that
her opponent pays attention to. As a result, the strategic complementarity between ac-
tions induces coordination in information acquisition. This second factor, together with
the symmetric setup of payoffs, makes the game only admit symmetric equilibria. That
is, both players attempt to acquire the same information (structure) and respond to the
signals in the same manner.
The equilibria of our game hinge on the magnitude of strategic complementarity rel-
ative to the marginal cost of information acquisition. The strategic complementarity
between players’ actions measures the physical coordination motive. The marginal cost
of information acquisition re￿ects the cost of coordination, since acquiring information
is a prerequisite to coordinating investment decisions. We show that multiple equilibria
emerge if coordination motive exceeds coordination cost. The intuition is that since the
bene￿t from coordination is large enough to cover the informational cost, multiple ways
of information acquisition could be supported in equilibrium.
Another interesting ￿nding concerns the information structure. Models with incom-
plete information often assume the signals to satisfy the Monotonic Likelihood Ratio
Property (MLRP, (Paul R. Milgrom 1981)). This property induces players to invest with
higher probability as the fundamental increases. Although MLRP seems quite intuitive4 MONTH YEAR
and natural, it could be violated by our rationally inattentive players under the same
condition that gives rise to multiplicity. Consider a player who is facing her opponent’s
weird non-MLRP strategy. This player is willing to respond by the same non-MLRP
strategy if her coordination motive dominates the coordination cost. Therefore, this pair
of non-MLRP strategies constitute a non-MLRP equilibrium.
Our paper models players’ information acquisition behavior through the framework of
"rational inattention". The basic idea of rational inattention is that people face informa-
tional capacity constraints de￿ned by Shannon’s information theory. That is, there are
limited bits that can be used to reduce the subjective uncertainty of some exogenous vari-
ables. As a result, players have to pay attention to those aspects most relevant to their
welfare and rationally ignore other information. (Christopher A. Sims 1998) pioneers
rational inattention to model price stickiness, where the capacity constraints dampen and
delay people’s responses to shocks. (Christopher A. Sims 2003) and (Christopher A.
Sims 2005) further develop the theory to accommodate dynamic programming in both
linear-quadratic and non-linear-quadratic cases. Later (Filip Matejka 2010) shows that a
perfectly attentive seller sets discrete and rigid prices to stimulate a rationally inattentive
buyer to consume more. Recently, (Bartosz Mackowiak and Mirko Wiederholt 2009)
examine rational inattention in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. They
show that prices respond strongly and quickly to idiosyncratic shocks but weakly and
slowly to aggregate shocks.
Inappliedwork, rationalinattentionismainlystudiedintwocases: thelinear-quadratic
case (e.g., (Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2009)), and the binary-action case. A leading
example of the latter is (Michael Woodford 2009), where ￿rms acquire information and
then decide whether to review their prices. Compared to the standard "Ss" model, the
data of individual price changes are better explained through a substantial information
cost. Our model also adopts the binary-action setup.
While the above models essentially focus on the single person (the representative
agent) decision problem, our model sheds light on information acquisition in strategic
situations. To this end, when using rational inattention as a modeling technique, ourVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 5
emphasis is on the ￿exibility of information acquisition. That is, we can avoid imposing
any physical restriction on the joint distribution of signals and the fundamental, since
the framework of rational inattention abstracts from the behavioral details of information
acquisition1. This ￿exibility is essential in our strategic environment in the sense that it
makes coordination in acquiring information possible. The ￿exible information acquisi-
tion together with coordination motive drives our main results. To facilitate our analysis,
we deviate from the standard setup of rational inattention by replacing ￿xed capacity
constraints with an information cost (in terms of utility) proportional to the amount (in
terms of bits) of information acquired. The ratio of such cost to the bits of information
is the marginal cost of information acquisition. It re￿ects the dif￿culty in acquiring in-
formation. As will be seen later, this marginal cost plays a key role in understanding
players’ equilibrium behavior.
The literature of global games has contributed a lot to our understanding of coordina-
tion under incomplete information, but our ￿ndings vary due to different approaches. As
introduced by (Carlsson and Damme 1993), the approach of global games appears as a
natural re￿nement to remove multiplicity in two-player, two-action games with common
knowledge of payoffs. In a global game model, players are not sure about the payoffs
but can make inference according to their privately observed signals. This uncertainty
about payoffs and other players’ beliefs weakens common knowledge among players,
and thus facilitates uniqueness. For example, when each player observes a private signal
equal to the fundamental plus an independent noise, a unique strategy pro￿le survives
iterative dominance as the signal noise vanishes ((Frankel, Morris and Pauzner 2003)).
Regaining the predictive power through removing the multiplicity, global game models
are widely applied in the study of currency attacks ((Stephen Morris and Hyun Song
Shin 1998)), debt pricing ((Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 2004)) and bank runs
((Itay Goldstein and Ady Pauzner 2005)), etc. All these models are characterized by
their exogenous information structures. Researchers assume the signals to equal the fun-
1For example, we need neither require signals to equal the fundamental plus some independent noise, nor assume the
normality.6 MONTH YEAR
damental plus some independent noise and so players only passively respond to such
signals. Researchers also let the noise vanish while ￿xing the additive structure to get
the limit uniqueness result. In other words, exogeneity and rigidity are the key features of
global game analysis. As shown later, it is this rigidity that leads to the limit uniqueness
result.
Another related work is characterized by endogenous but rigid information acquisi-
tion. In (Christian Hellwig and Laura Veldkamp 2009), a continuum of agents purchase
from a set of signals and then play a coordination game. In this model, information
acquisition is endogenous in the sense that players decide which signals to buy accord-
ing to their own interests. But information acquisition is still rigid, since signals and
fundamentals are assumed to be jointly Gaussian, which renders the signals equal to
(the linear combinations of) fundamentals plus some Gaussian noise. Both (Hellwig and
Veldkamp 2009) and our model show that if players’ actions are strategic complements,
so are their information choices. However, our research provides different insight about
the emergence of multiplicity. In their example of near-continuous information choice,
multiple equilibria emerge once strategic complementarity exists and signals have a pub-
lic component. In other words, multiplicity comes from excessive coordination through
public information or the public component of signals. In a sharp contrast to (Hellwig
and Veldkamp 2009), we elaborate that multiple equilibria emerge once strategic com-
plementarity exceeds marginal cost of information acquisition, no matter whether there
is public information. That is, excessive coordination in acquiring private information
leads to multiplicity.
The point of departure of this paper relative to coordination games with incomplete
information is its endogenous and ￿exible information acquisition. Endogeneity refers
to that the players can choose from a set of information structures. Information acqui-
sition is ￿exible in the sense that the choice set of information structures consists of all
conditional distributions of signals given the fundamental. Therefore, our model differs
from (Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009) in the aspect of restrictions imposed on the infor-
mation structures. (Hellwig and Veldkamp 2009) assumes the jointly Gaussian signalsVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 7
to maintain the tractability. We abolish all restrictions in order to avoid any arbitrariness
in assuming information structures. Due to the succinct nature of rational inattention
and the binary-action setup of the game, our model remains tractable with this general
assumption.
To examine why ￿exibility is important, it is instructive to contrast the role of infor-
mation acquisition in our framework from that in an extended global game model. In the
extended model, player i observes her signal xi D ￿ C ￿
￿1=2
i ￿ "i, where ￿ is the funda-
mental, "i is a noise with density f and ￿i is the precision of her signal. According to
our classi￿cation, the extended model is endogenous but rigid. It inherits the rigidity of
the standard ones by maintaining the additive information structure, but it is endogenous
in that players are allowed to purchase more accurate signals by increasing precision ￿i
at some cost. Intuitively, as such cost decreases, players coordinate in acquiring sig-
nals with higher precision. Due to the private nature of such signals, higher precision
weakens players’ common knowledge of payoffs. Hence, we regain the limit uniqueness
result in this extended global game model. The rigidity of this extended model is also
represented by the fact that players are forced to pay equal attention to every possible
realization of the fundamental. That is, the distribution of player i’s observational error
￿
￿1=2
i ￿ "i does not vary in ￿. As a result, players can only coordinate in choosing the
overall precision but have no freedom to coordinate their attention allocation for different
regions of ￿. In our model, however, there is no restriction on the choice of information
structures. Players enjoy a better coordination from their ￿exibility of allocating atten-
tion when informational cost decreases. Therefore, in contrast to the model with rigidity,
decreasing informational cost strengthens common knowledge and then leads to multi-
plicity. These rigid and ￿exible information acquisition also differ in their welfare im-
plications. Consistent with the literature of global games, rigid information acquisition
leads to a unique but inef￿cient equilibrium when information becomes cheaper. Flexi-
ble information acquisition, however, gives rise to multiple equilibria but makes ef￿cient
coordination possible.
Besides analyzing private information acquisition, we also conduct a comparative sta-8 MONTH YEAR
tic analysis with respect to public information. We show that the role of public informa-
tion in our approach is similar to that in the global game models. We also discuss several
extensions of our model that accommodate general informational cost, ￿xed capacity
constraints, multiple players, state-dependent strategic complementarity, and discontin-
uous payoff gain function, respectively.
We proceed as follows. Section I sets up the model and prepares some simple facts
about information acquisition behavior in equilibrium. In Section II, we characterize
the equilibria and gain some intuition through comparative static analysis. Section III
compares our approach to an extended global game model and unpacks the origin of
the difference. Section IV examines effects of public information through a comparative
static analysis with respect to the common prior. We conclude in Section V by discussing
several extensions of our main model. Most proofs are relegated to Appendix A, B, C
and D.
I. The Model
A. The Basic Environment
We de￿ne our game as follows. Two players2 play a coordination game with payoffs
shown by Table 1.
TABLE 1￿PAYOFF MATRIX CONDITIONAL ON FUNDAMENTAL
invest not invest
invest ￿;￿ ￿ ￿ r;0
not invest 0;￿ ￿ r 0;0
:
Here ￿ is a random state with support 2 ￿ R; ￿ is called "the fundamental state"
hereafter. The action set of player i 2 f1;2g is Ai D f0;1g, where 1 stands for invest and
2The "two-player" setup is not as restrictive as it seems. All our results remain valid when there is a continuum of
players if we rede￿ne the payoff for "invest" as ￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/, where m is the fraction of the players that invest. The
"n-player" case is discussed in V.C.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 9
0 stands for not invest, respectively. Thus player i’s payoff from taking ai 2 Ai when the
state is ￿ and her opponent takes aj 2 Aj is given by
ui
￿
ai;aj;￿
￿
D ai ￿
￿
￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ aj
￿￿
:
Note that r > 0 is the cost of miscoordination. It measures the degree of strategic
complementarity3. Fundamental ￿ is drawn from 2 according to a common prior P,
which is a probability measure over 2. We assume that P is absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure over R.4
This game can be interpreted as a coordination problem. Two players coordinate in
investing in a project with uncertain future cash ￿ow ￿ 2 2. Player i 2 f1;2g must
decide whether to invest (ai D 1) or not invest (ai D 0). If both players invest, each
enjoys a payoff ￿. If only one player invests, she receives ￿ ￿r. The payoff to not invest
is always zero, regardless of the other player’s action.
Togainsomeintuition, notethatwheninformationiscompleteand￿ 2 [0;r], thereex-
isttwostrictNashequilibria: (invest, invest)and(notinvest, notinvest). Thismultiplicity
results from excessive coordination induced by common knowledge of the fundamental.
Ourmodelfocusesonthecaseofincompleteinformation. Supposeplayeri isequipped
with an information structure .Si;qi/ that conveys information about ￿. Here Si ￿ R is
the set of realizations of player i’s signal, and qi .sij￿/ is the conditional probability den-
sity function of her signal. We assume conditional independence between si and sj given
￿, i 6D j. Given the information structure .Si;qi/, player i’s strategy can be represented
by a mapping ￿i from Si to [0;1], where ￿i .si/ denotes the probability of choosing 1
upon observing si 2 Si. Player i’s expected payoff given
￿
si;sj;￿
￿
becomes
￿i .si/ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ j
￿
sj
￿￿￿
:
3We assume constant strategic complementarity for the sake of simplicity. The more general case with a state-
dependent strategic complementarity r .￿/ > 0 almost surely is discussed in Subsection V.D.
4Note that public information affects the common prior, thus its effects on the equilibria can be studied through
comparative static analysis with respect to the common prior, as shown in Section IV.10 MONTH YEAR
Then we can de￿ne
Ui
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
D
Z
￿
Z
si
Z
sj
￿i .si/
￿
￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ j
￿
sj
￿￿￿
qi .sij￿/qj
￿
sjj￿
￿
dsidsjdP .￿/; (1)
as player i’s expected payoff with strategy pro￿le
￿
￿i;￿ j
￿
under information structure
￿
.Si;qi/;
￿
Sj;qj
￿￿
, i; j 2 f1;2g, i 6D j.
Now we consider a larger game with ￿exible information choices: player i chooses
strategy ..Si;qi/;￿i/ according to the preference given by (1), i 2 f1;2g. More pre-
cisely, player i acquires information through choosing information structure .Si;qi/, and
then takes (mixed) action ￿i according to her signal si generated by .Si;qi/. The solution
concept is Nash equilibrium. Note that the strategy pro￿le
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
is common knowledge in equilibrium, but the players’ beliefs about the fundamental and
others’ actions are heterogeneous due to the private nature of their signals.
The conditional density qi .sij￿/ describes player i’s information acquisition strategy.
By choosing different functional forms for qi .sij￿/, player i can make her signal covary
with the fundamental in any way she would like. Intuitively, if player i’s welfare is
sensitive to the ￿uctuation of the fundamental within some range A ￿ 2, she would pay
much attention to this event by making her signal si highly correlated with ￿ 2 A. In this
sense, choosing an information structure can be interpreted as hiring an analyst to write
a report with emphasis on your interests.
If information acquisition incurs no cost, player i would like to establish a one-to-one
mapping between si and ￿, and thus obtain all information of the fundamental. This
makes our problem a trivial one since it is just a coordination game with complete in-
formation. In practice, however, information acquisition is unlikely to be free. We study
the more interesting case of costly information acquisition. To do so, we associate eachVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 11
conditional density qi .sij￿/ with a cost ￿ ￿ I .qi/, where
I .qi/ D
Z
￿
Z
si
qi .sij￿/lnqi .sij￿/ ￿ dsi ￿ dP .￿/
￿
Z
si
Z
￿
qi .sij￿/ ￿ dP .￿/ ￿ ln
￿Z
￿
qi .sij￿/ ￿ dP .￿/
￿
￿ dsi (2)
is the mutual information between the two random variables si and ￿. It measures the
amount of information about ￿ conveyed by si.56 The marginal cost of information ac-
quisition is ￿ > 0. It re￿ects the dif￿culty in acquiring information. By de￿nition, I .qi/
is uniquely determined by the functional form of qi .sij￿/. Indeed, a functional form of
qi .sij￿/ de￿nes a speci￿c way of information acquisition. It determines what informa-
tion about ￿ to be acquired. Different forms of qi .sij￿/ may generate the same value for
I .qi/, i.e., the same amount of information may be collected from different aspects of
￿. Since information acquisition is costly, it is not wise for player i to have a signal very
informative of all values of ￿. She should make it sensitive to the events most relevant to
her welfare.
Taking into account of information cost, player i’s payoff through taking strategy
..Si;qi/;￿i/ is her expected future cash ￿ow minus her cost of information acquisition,
i.e.,
Vi
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
D Ui
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ I .qi/;i 6D j: (3)
The following de￿nition summarizes the game:
DEFINITION 1: (Costly Information Acquisition Game G .r;￿/): Two players with
5Here the unit of I .qi/ is "nat". If "ln" is replaced with "log2", the unit becomes "bit". Knowing the result of a single
toss of a fair coin obtains 1 bit of information. Since 1 bit equals ln2 nats, choosing bit or nat as the unit does not make
any difference to our analysis.
6Shannon’s mutual information is a natural measure of information about one random variable conveyed by another
one. Moreover, it is the uniquely "right" way to measure information under some intuitive axioms. (Thomas M. Cover and
Joy A. Thomas1991) provide a detailed discussionof mutual information. However, this speci￿c entropic functionalform
is not necessary for our qualitative results. The essence is the ￿exibility in choosing information structures. Subsection
V.A discusses more general forms.12 MONTH YEAR
preference (3) play the game through choosing ..Si;qi/;￿i/, where Si ￿ R is the set
of realizations of player i’s signal, qi .sij￿/ is the conditional probability density of her
signal, and ￿i is a mapping from Si to [0;1] that de￿nes player i’s action upon receiving
signal si 2 Si, i 2 f1;2g: The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium.
In principle, this problem seems hard to deal with, since players’ possible strategies
belong to afunctional space, and even S1 and S2, the setsof realizations of the signals, are
endogenous. Fortunately, some patterns emerge from the players’ optimal information
acquisition behavior. They help simplify our problem a lot.
B. Some Simple Facts About The Equilibria
Suppose ..Si;qi/;￿i/ is player i’s equilibrium strategy. Let
Si;I D fsi 2 Si : ￿i .si/ D 1g;
Si;N D fsi 2 Si : ￿i .si/ D 0g;
and
Si;ind D fsi 2 Si : ￿i .si/ 2 .0;1/g:
Si;I (Si;N) is the set of signal realizations such that player i de￿nitely invests (not invests).
Player i is indifferent when her signal belongs to Si;ind. Then
￿
Si;I; Si;N; Si;ind
￿
forms a
partition of Si.
It is worth noting that player i has no incentive to discern signal realizations within any
of Si;I, Si;N and Si;ind, since this effort requires more information (cost) but generates
no extra bene￿t. In addition, because player i is indifferent between "invest" and "not
invest" upon event Si;ind, she would rationally pay no attention to distinguish this event
from other realizations. Hence, players always play pure strategies upon receiving their
signals. Lemma 1 summarizes this argument.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 13
LEMMA 1: In any equilibrium of costly information acquisition game G .r;￿/, #Si D
1 or 2, and Pr
￿
Si;ind
￿
D 0, 8i 2 f1;2g.
PROOF:
See Appendix A.
Suppose ..Si;qi/;￿i/ is player i’s equilibrium strategy. Then it induces a conditional
probability function mi from 2 to [0;1], such that playeri invests with probability mi .￿/
when the fundamental equals ￿. In fact, Lemma 1 implies that mi also suf￿ces to char-
acterize player i’s equilibrium strategy ..Si;qi/;￿i/. In other words, we can recover
..Si;qi/;￿i/ from mi. Speci￿cally, in the trivial case
mi .￿/ D 1 a:s: (or mi .￿/ D 0 a:s:),
let
Si D
￿
si;I
￿
, qi
￿
si;Ij￿
￿
D 1 a:s:, ￿i
￿
si;I
￿
D 1
(or Si D
￿
si;N
￿
, qi
￿
si;Nj￿
￿
D 0 a:s:, ￿i
￿
si;N
￿
D 0);
otherwise, let
Si D
￿
si;I;si;N
￿
,
8￿ 2 2, qi
￿
si;Ij￿
￿
D mi .￿/, qi
￿
si;Nj￿
￿
D 1 ￿ mi .￿/,
￿i
￿
si;I
￿
D 1, ￿i
￿
si;N
￿
D 0:
Therefore, we can treat conditional probability function mi as player i’s strategy and just
focus on the strategy pro￿le .m1;m2/ for our equilibrium analysis.
Without any confusion, we can abuse the notation a little to rewrite player i’s expected
payoff as
(4) Ui
￿
mi;m j
￿
D
Z
mi .￿/ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿￿
￿ dP .￿/, i; j 2 f1;2g and i 6D j:14 MONTH YEAR
This expression is derived from (1).
Lemma 1 also implies that I .qi/, the amount of information acquired, is a functional
of mi. Thus we use I .mi/ instead of I .qi/ hereafter. By (2) and Lemma 1, I .mi/ has
the expression
I .mi/ D
Z
[mi .￿/lnmi .￿/ C .1 ￿ mi .￿//ln.1 ￿ mi .￿//]dP .￿/
￿pIi ln pIi ￿ .1 ￿ pIi/ln.1 ￿ pIi/;
where
pIi D Pr.ai D 1/ D
Z
mi .￿/dP .￿/
is player i’s unconditional probability of investing.
Taking information cost into account, player i’s overall expected payoff (in terms of
mi, m j) is
(5) Vi
￿
mi;m j
￿
D Ui
￿
mi;m j
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ I .mi/, i; j 2 f1;2g and i 6D j:
For the sake of simplicity, the rest of this paper abstracts away from the story of costly
information acquisition and just treats the problem as a two-player game with preference
(5) and strategy pair .m1;m2/. We assume each player’s strategy space is L1 .2; P/, i.e.,
the space of all P-integrable functions on 2 equipped with the norm
km1 ￿ m2kL1.2;P/ D
Z
2
jm1 .￿/ ￿ m2 .￿/jdP .￿/ .
II. The Equilibria of the Game
A Nash equilibrium of the costly information acquisition game is a strategy pro￿le
.m1;m2/ solving the the following problem:
mi 2 arg max
e mi2L1.2;P/
Vi
￿
e mi;m j
￿
D Ui
￿
e mi;m j
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ I .e mi/VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 15
s.t. e mi .￿/ 2 [0;1];8￿ 2 2;
where L1 .2; P/ is the space of P-integrable functions on 2, i; j 2 f1;2g and i 6D j.
In order to solve this game, it is helpful to ￿rst look at the binary-action decision
problem with information acquisition.
A. Decision Problem
Consider an agent who has to choose an action a 2 f0;1g and will receive a payoff
u .a;￿/, where ￿, 2 and P are de￿ned as before. Before making a decision, the agent
can acquire information in a manner speci￿ed in Section I. We know that her strategy
can be represented by a function
m .￿/ D Pr.taking action 1jthe fundamental is ￿/ .
Let
1u .￿/ D u .1;￿/ ￿ u .0;￿/
be the payoff gain from taking action 1 over action 0. Then Proposition 1 of (Ming Yang
2011) (also Lemma 2 of (Michael Woodford 2008)) characterizes the agent’s optimal
strategy m, as shown below.
PROPOSITION 1: Let Pr.1u .￿/ 6D 0/ > 0 to exclude the trivial case that the agent is
always indifferent between the two actions. Let
m 2 ￿ ,
￿
m 2 L1 .2; P/ : 8￿ 2 2, m .￿/ 2 [0;1]
￿
be an optimal strategy and
p1 D
Z
2
m .￿/dP .￿/
be the corresponding unconditional probability of taking action 1. Then,
i) the optimal strategy is unique;16 MONTH YEAR
ii) the optimal strategy is an interior point of ￿ (which is equivalent to p1 2 .0;1/) if
and only if
(6)
Z
2
exp
￿
￿￿11u .￿/
￿
dP .￿/ > 1 and
Z
2
exp
￿
￿￿￿11u .￿/
￿
dP .￿/ > 1 ;
in this case, the optimal strategy m is characterized by
(7) 1u .￿/ D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
p1
1 ￿ p1
￿￿
for all ￿ 2 2;
iii) the optimal strategy is p1 D 1 (i.e., m .￿/ D 1 almost surely) if and only if
(8)
Z
2
exp
￿
￿￿11u .￿/
￿
dP .￿/ > 1 and
Z
2
exp
￿
￿￿￿11u .￿/
￿
dP .￿/ ￿ 1 ;
iv) the optimal strategy is p1 D 0 (i.e., m .￿/ D 0 almost surely) if and only if
(9)
Z
2
exp
￿
￿￿11u .￿/
￿
dP .￿/ ￿ 1 and
Z
2
exp
￿
￿￿￿11u .￿/
￿
dP .￿/ > 1 ;
v) the three cases speci￿ed by (6), (8) and (9) exhaust all possibilities.
PROOF:
See the appendix of (Yang 2011).
(Yang 2011) provides a detailed discussion about the intuition behind this proposition.
To focus on analyzing the game, we omit such discussion here and refer the interested
readers to (Yang 2011). In the rest of this paper, we conduct equilibrium analysis based
on Proposition 1.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 17
B. Characterizing the Equilibria
Given player j’s strategy m j, player i’s payoff gain from investing over not investing
is
1ui .￿/ D ￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿
.
As shown in Proposition 1, this payoff gain function determines player i’s incentive to
acquire information. Player i acquires information for two reasons. First, she wants to
reduce her subjective uncertainty about the fundamental. Second, she can coordinate her
investment decision with her opponent’s through coordinating in acquiring information.
For the second reason, player i should pay attention to the events that player j pays at-
tention to. If player j never acquires information (e.g., she always invests), however,
this second reason does not exist for player i. In addition, if the fundamental is positive
with high probability, the ￿rst reason does not hold either. Then player i may ￿nd it
optimal to always invest without acquiring any information. This in turn con￿rms player
j’s non-information acquisition strategy and thus constitutes an equilibrium. Such non-
information acquisition equilibria are trivial and not interesting, we would like to kill
them by the following assumption and focus on the equilibria with information acquisi-
tion.
Assumption: Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
> 1 and Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
> e￿￿1r, where the expectation
is taken according to common prior P.7
The intuition behind this assumption is that common prior P should not concentrate
within interval [0;r]. Otherwise, the players are commonly con￿dent about the event
￿ 2 [0;r]. Once a player always invests (not invests), the other one ￿nds her payoff
gain positive (negative) with high probability and thus loses her incentive to acquire
information. For example, if the common prior is N
￿
t;￿2￿
, this assumption is equivalent
7In Proposition 8 and 9 of Appendix B, we prove that there exists a pooling equilibrium "mi .￿/ D m j .￿/ D 1
almost surely" ("mi .￿/ D m j .￿/ D 0 almost surely") if and only if Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
￿ 1 (Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
￿ e￿￿1r),
where the expectation is taken according to common prior P. Therefore, this assumption excludes all equilibria without
information acquisition.18 MONTH YEAR
to
￿2 > r ￿ ￿ and t 2
￿
r ￿ ￿￿1￿2=2;￿￿1￿2=2
￿
;
if the common prior is a uniform distribution over interval [￿A;r C A], then the as-
sumption holds when A > 0 is large enough. All results that follow are derived under
this assumption, unless otherwise noted.
PROPOSITION 2: In equilibrium, player i’s strategy is characterized by
(10) ￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿
D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
mi .￿/
1 ￿ mi .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pIi
1 ￿ pIi
￿￿
almost surely,
where
(11) pIi D
Z
mi .￿/dP .￿/ 2 .0;1/
is player i’s unconditional probability of investing and i; j 2 f1;2g;i 6D j.
PROOF:
Note that
1ui .￿/ D ￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿
and
Eexp
￿
￿￿11ui .￿/
￿
D Eexp
￿
￿￿1 ￿
￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿￿￿
￿ Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
> 1 ,VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 19
where the last inequality follows the assumption Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
> e￿￿1r. Also note that
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿11ui .￿/
￿
D Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1 ￿
￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿￿￿
￿ Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
> 1 ,
where the last inequality is just the assumption. Therefore, (10) and (11) are a direct
implication of ii) of Proposition 1.
According to Proposition 2, any pair .m1;m2/ 2 ￿￿￿ is an equilibrium of the costly
information acquisition game if and only if it satis￿es (10) and (11). A direct corollary
is that all equilibria are "interior", as shown below.
COROLLARY 1: If .m1;m2/ is an equilibrium of the costly information acquisition
game, Pr.mi .￿/ 2 .0;1// D 1, i 2 f1;2g.
PROOF:
We prove this corollary by contradiction. Suppose Pr.mi .￿/ 2 .0;1// < 1. Without
loss of generality, let
Ai D f￿ 2 2 : mi .￿/ D 1g
be a set with non-zero probability. According to (11), pIi 2 .0;1/. Thus the right hand
side of (10) equals in￿nity for all ￿ 2 Ai while the left hand side of (10) remains ￿nite.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, Pr.mi .￿/ D 1/ D 0. A symmetric argument shows
that Pr.mi .￿/ D 0/ D 0.
Since payoff matrix (Table 1) is symmetric and both players face the same informa-
tional cost, it is natural to expect symmetric equilibria.
PROPOSITION 3: All equilibria of the costly information acquisition game are sym-
metric, i.e., Pr.m1 .￿/ D m2 .￿// D 1.
PROOF:20 MONTH YEAR
See Appendix B.
This proposition allows us to use a single function m to represent the equilibrium
hereafter.
COROLLARY 2: .m1;m2/isanequilibriumofthecostlyinformationacquisitiongame
if and only if there exists an m 2 ￿, such that mi .￿/ D m .￿/ almost surely for i 2
f1;2g; and
(12) 8￿ 2 2, ￿ ￿ r ￿ [1 ￿ m .￿/] D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿￿
;
where
pI D
Z
m .￿/ ￿ dP .￿/:
PROOF:
This corollary directly follows Proposition 3.
The result of Corollary 2 is intuitive. Given player j’s strategy m j .￿/ D m .￿/, the left
hand side of (12) is player i’s marginal bene￿t of increasing her conditional probability
of "invest". Since ￿ > 0 is the marginal cost of acquiring an extra bit of information and
￿
ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿￿
is the "derivative" of the amount of information with respect to mi .￿/, the right hand
side of (12) is player i’s marginal cost of increasing mi .￿/. (12) states that the marginal
cost must equal the marginal bene￿t. Also note that
ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿
is the unconditional (or average) log-likelihood ratio of "invest" relative to "not invest",
while
ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
is the log-likelihood ratio conditional on ￿. Then (12) indicates that if the marginalVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 21
bene￿t
￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m .￿//
is positive (negative) given ￿, players should invest with a probability higher (lower) than
the average level.
It is easy to verify that the graph
￿
.￿;m/j￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/ D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m
1 ￿ m
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿￿￿
is central-symmetric8 in the ￿ ￿ m plane about the point .￿0;1=2/, where
(13) ￿0 D r=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿
:
Combining (12) and (13) leads to
￿ ￿ ￿0 D ￿ ￿ ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
C r ￿
￿
1
2
￿ m .￿/
￿
:
Thus any solution of (12) has an expression m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ and can be ordered/indexed by
￿0, i.e.,
(14) ￿ ￿ ￿0 D ￿ ￿ ln
￿
m .￿ ￿ ￿0/
1 ￿ m .￿ ￿ ￿0/
￿
C r ￿
￿
1
2
￿ m .￿ ￿ ￿0/
￿
:
In other words, any solution is a translation of function m .￿/, which is implicitly de￿ned
by
￿ D ￿ ￿ ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
C r ￿
￿
1
2
￿ m .￿/
￿
:
A solution of (12) is jointly determined by its position ￿0 and its "shape" m .￿/. It is
worth pointing out that not every ￿0 2 R suf￿ces to make m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ a solution of the
game. ￿0 is endogenously determined by the equilibrium.
We ￿rst analyze the "shape" of the equilibrium. The "shape" m .￿/ is determined
8This symmetry comes from the fact that the strategic complementarity r does not depend on ￿.22 MONTH YEAR
by e r , r
4￿￿, the ratio of strategic complementarity r to marginal cost of information
acquisition ￿. Figure 1 shows how m .￿/ evolves ase r increases.
e r < 1 e r D 1
e r > 1 e r ! 1 (i.e. ￿ ! 0)
FIGURE 1. EVOLUTION OF THE SHAPE OF EQUILIBRIUM
What information is acquired in equilibrium? According to Lemma 1, we can re-
cover the equilibrium information structure from m .￿/. Let Si D f0;1g be the set
of realizations for player i’s signal si. Player i invests if si D 1 and does not in-
vest if otherwise. This information structure is characterized by conditional probability
Pr.si D 1j￿/ D m .￿/. Since the probability of investing is highly sensitive to ￿ whereVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 23
slope
￿
￿ ￿
dm.￿/
d￿
￿
￿ ￿ is large,
￿
￿ ￿
dm.￿/
d￿
￿
￿ ￿ re￿ects player i’s attentiveness around ￿9. Under this in-
terpretation, Figure 1 reveals that players actively collect information for intermediate
values of the fundamental but are rationally inattentive to values at the tails. This re-
sult coincides with our intuition. Players do not care about whether their payoff is ￿ve
hundred or six hundred dollars, since they should invest in either case. But they do care
about if it is positive or not. Thus they pay attention to the region around zero.
The equilibrium strategy has an "S"-like shape. This represents players’ desire to play
a switching strategy10, i.e., invest if the fundamental is high and do not invest if it is
low. A switching strategy could be optimal when there is no informational cost, but
it is no longer the case when ￿ > 0. As shown in Figure 1, lim￿!1 m .￿/ D 1 and
lim￿!￿1 m .￿/ D 0, thus players almost certainly invest (not invest) as the fundamental
becomes large (negatively large) but are reluctant to do so for the intermediate values.
How does information acquisition affect coordination? First, the equilibrium strategy
becomes ￿atter as ￿ increases. Higher informational cost directly weakens players’ abil-
itytoacquireinformation. Hencemorerandomerrorsenterplayers’response. Moreover,
expecting that her opponent reacts in a noisier fashion, the player no longer has as much
incentive to coordinate as before. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy becomes even less
decisive.
Second, multiple equilibria might emerge11 as e r D r
4￿￿ exceeds unity. As shown in
the low-left subgraph of Figure 1, there exist ￿1 < ￿2 such that multiple values of m .￿/
satisfy (14) for all ￿ within [￿1;￿2]. Note that the strategic complementarity between
players’ actions measures the coordination motive. The marginal cost of information
acquisition re￿ects the cost of coordination, since acquiring information is a prerequisite
to coordinating investment decisions. Hence, when coordination motive dominates co-
ordination cost, there could be excessive coordination in information acquisition, which
leads to too much common knowledge and thus multiplicity.
Third, Monotonic Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), an assumption often made in
9
￿
￿
￿
dm.￿/
d￿
￿
￿
￿ , 1 when m .￿/ is discontinuous at ￿.
10A switching strategy is m .￿/ D 0 for all ￿ below some threshold and m .￿/ D 1 otherwise.
11We prove this multiplicity later.24 MONTH YEAR
applied works of global games, could be violated by our rationally inattentive players
when e r D r
4￿￿ > 1.12 When coordination motive exceeds coordination cost, a player
has enough incentive and ability to coordinate with her opponent’s weird non-MLRP
strategy. Therefore, our approach provides a condition to assess the ￿tness of MLRP.
Finally, as shown in the low-right subgraph of Figure 1, the equilibrium approximates
the switching strategy when informational cost vanishes. This result coincides with the
equilibria of coordination games with complete information.
Whene r D r
4￿￿ ￿ 1, there is a unique shape of m .￿/ to satisfy (14). However, in￿nitely
many shapes of m .￿/ satisfy (14) whene r exceeds unity. Figure 2 shows four typical such
shapes.
FIGURE 2. TYPICAL SHAPES OF EQUILIBRIA
12We say a player’s strategy satis￿es MLRP if her conditional probability of investing increases in the fundamental.
In other words, the information structure is more likely to ask the players to invest for higher fundamental.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 25
De￿ne the set of possible shapes of equilibria as
M.r;￿/ ,
￿
m 2 ￿ : ￿ D ￿ ￿ ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
C r ￿
￿
1
2
￿ m .￿/
￿￿
:
Note that
#M.r;￿/ D
8
<
:
1 ife r D r
4￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ife r D r
4￿￿ > 1
:
Given r and ￿, an equilibrium m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ is determined by its shape m 2 M.r;￿/ as
well as its position ￿0. According to (13), the equilibrium condition for ￿0 is
￿0 D r=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ln
￿ R
m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ ￿ dP .￿/
1 ￿
R
m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ ￿ dP .￿/
￿
:
Since public information is summarized in common prior P, the above equation shows
that public information affects the equilibrium only through changing its position ￿0 but
leaves its shape unaffected. Hence, searching for an equilibrium with any given shape
m 2 M.r;￿/ is equivalent to looking for a ￿xed point ￿0 of the following mapping:
(15) g .￿0;m/ , r=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ln
￿ R
m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ ￿ dP .￿/
1 ￿
R
m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ ￿ dP .￿/
￿
:
Ase r D r
4￿￿ > 1 allows multiple shapes, a natural question is whether this multiplicity
of possible shapes leads to multiple equilibria. We answer this question in Section III.
III. Private Information Acquisition: Rigidity versus Flexibility
In this section, we ￿rst show that multiple equilibria emerge when strategic comple-
mentarity dominates informational cost. We then contrast our result to that of an ex-
tended global game model to illustrate why rigid and ￿exible information acquisition
play so different roles. Finally, we conduct a welfare comparison.
LEMMA 2: For any possible shape m 2 M.r;￿/, there exists ￿0 2 R such that
m .￿ ￿ ￿0/ is an equilibrium.
PROOF:26 MONTH YEAR
See Appendix C.
This lemma proves the existence of the equilibrium. Moreover, it also speci￿es the
condition for multiple equilibria, as shown in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4: If e r D r
4￿￿ > 1, then the costly information acquisition game has
in￿nitely many equilibria.
PROOF:
As shown in Section II, #M.r;￿/ D 1 whene r D r
4￿￿ > 1. Therefore, this proposition
is a direct implication of Lemma 2.
This result is consistent with our previous intuition. Since strategic complementarity
exceeds informational cost, players would excessively coordinate in acquiring informa-
tion. This excessive coordination generates too much common knowledge of payoffs and
￿nally leads to multiplicity.
In order to compare our result to previous works, we construct an extended global
game model, where the players are allowed to purchase more accurate signals but cannot
changeanyotheraspectoftheinformationstructure. Speci￿cally, lettwoplayersplaythe
game with payoff matrix (Table 1). The common prior about fundamental ￿ is P. Player
i 2 f1;2g takes action ai 2 f0;1g after observing her private signal xi D ￿ C ￿
￿1=2
i ￿ "i,
where "i is distributed according to a density function f with full support, E"i D 0 and
Var ."i/ < 1. Here ￿i represents the precision of player i’s private information. The
cost of acquiring information of precision ￿ is c ￿ h .￿/, where c > 0 is an exogenous
parameter and h is continuous and non-decreasing with h .0/ D 0. The information
structure is rigid in the sense that the additive nature of the signal generating process is
not adjustable.
Each player’s strategy involves simultaneously choosing a precision ￿i 2 [0;C1/
and an action rule si : R![0;1], which means that player i chooses 1 with probability
si .xi/ upon observing xi. We write G .c/ for the game with cost parameter c.
PROPOSITION 5: Let
￿
￿1 .c/;￿2 .c/
￿
be the precision pair chosen in an equilibrium
of G .c/. Then for any ￿ > 0, there exists c > 0, such that for all c < c, ￿i .c/ > ￿,VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 27
i 2 f1;2g.
PROOF:
See Appendix C.
This proposition reads that players would like to acquire information of arbitrarily
large precision if the cost of doing so is arbitrarily small. A well known result in the lit-
erature of global games is that uniqueness is guaranteed if private signals are suf￿ciently
accurate relative to public information (e.g. Morris and Shin (2004)). Proposition 5
allows us to establish the standard global game result in this extended model.
COROLLARY 3: For any ￿ > 0, there exists c > 0, such that for all c < c, if strategy
s : R!f0;1g survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies in game G .c/,
then s .x/ D 0 for all x ￿ r=2 ￿ ￿ and s .x/ D 1 for all x ￿ r=2 C ￿.
PROOF:
See Appendix C.
According to Corollary 3, all equilibria become approximately the unique switching
strategy
s .x/ D
8
<
:
0 if x ￿ r=2
1 if x > r=2
when informational cost vanishes. This result is consistent with the standard global game
arguments. That is, lowering informational cost induces more accurate private signals,
which reduces common knowledge and thus facilitates the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
According to Proposition 4, however, our model with ￿exible information acquisition
has an opposite prediction: lowering informational cost enhances common knowledge
and facilitates multiplicity. This sharp comparison results from the rigidity assumed in
the global game models where the private noise is additive to the fundamental. This
additivity imposes a strong restriction on players’ information acquisition: since players
observational error ￿￿1=2 ￿ " does not depend on ￿, the players are forced to pay equal
attention to every possible realization of the fundamental.28 MONTH YEAR
The rigid and ￿exible information acquisition also differ in their welfare implications.
It is well known that the unique equilibrium (when c ! 0 and thus ￿ ! 1) of global
gamesisinef￿cient. Bothplayerswouldhaveenjoyedhigherpayoffshadtheycommitted
to a strategy
e s .x/ D
8
<
:
0 if x ￿ 0
1 if x > 0
:
In our model with ￿exible information acquisition, however, 8b ￿ 2 [0;r],
m .￿/ D
8
<
:
0 if ￿ ￿b ￿
1 if ￿ >b ￿
is an equilibrium when informational cost ￿ vanishes. Thus both the most ef￿cient
strategyb ￿ D 0 and the most inef￿cient strategyb ￿ D r can be supported in equilibria. In
other words, rather than converging to the unique but inef￿cient equilibrium, lowering
informational cost provides our rationally inattentive players an opportunity to achieve a
better equilibrium at the risk of being trapped in an even worse one.
IV. Impacts of Public Information
In our model, players pay some cost and acquire private information. We assume
that public information is directly observable without incurring any cost. Thus public
information is common knowledge. It affects players’ decisions through changing the
commonprioraboutthefundamental. Thissectionconductsacomparativestaticanalysis
with respect to common prior P to study the impacts of public information. Roughly
speaking, if the common prior concentrates within the intermediate region [0;r], both
players are con￿dent that the event f￿ 2 [0;r]g happens with high probability. Thus the
coordination motive dominates the fundamental effects and multiple equilibria emerge
regardless of the informational cost.
PROPOSITION 6: For any r > 0 and ￿ > 0, the costly information acquisition game
has multiple equilibria if Ee￿￿￿1￿ ￿ 1 and Ee￿￿1.￿￿r/ ￿ 1, where the expectation isVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 29
taken according to common prior P.
PROOF:
See Appendix D.
Whentheconditionofthispropositionholds, atleastboth"alwaysinvest"(i.e., m .￿/ D
1 almost surely) and "never invest" (i.e., m .￿/ D 0 almost surely) are equilibria13. The
players ￿nd it optimal to not acquire any information and coordinate their investment de-
cisions perfectly. We can gain some intuition from a Gaussian common prior N
￿
t;￿2￿
.
In this case, it is easy to verify that condition
Ee￿￿￿1￿ ￿ 1 and Ee￿￿1.￿￿r/ ￿ 1
is equivalent to
￿2 ￿ r ￿ ￿ and t 2
￿
￿￿1￿2=2;r ￿ ￿￿1￿2=2
￿
.
That is, the common prior should have a small dispersion and its probability peak should
be close to r=2. Proposition 6 is strong in the sense that the criterion
Ee￿￿￿1￿ ￿ 1 and Ee￿￿1.￿￿r/ ￿ 1
is uniform for all common priors. To make our result comparable to the standard global
game results, we establish the following corollary:
COROLLARY 4: Let p.￿/ be a probability density function. Then, for any r > 0,
￿ > 0 and y 2 .0;r/, there exists ￿ > 0 such that for all ￿ > ￿, the costly information
acquisitiongamewithcommonprior￿1=2p
￿
￿1=2 .￿ ￿ y/
￿
(densityfunction)hasmultiple
equilibria.
PROOF:
See Appendix D.
13We prove this result in Proposition 8 and 9 in Appendix B.30 MONTH YEAR
Here ￿ represents the precision of public information. Speci￿cally, suppose players
have a uniform common prior on R14 and then observe a public signal
y D ￿ C ￿￿1=2 ￿ " ,
where " is distributed according to a density function p. Hence, their updated common
prior15 has a density function ￿1=2p
￿
￿1=2 .￿ ￿ y/
￿
. Therefore, Corollary 4 reads that
providing public information of high precision leads to multiplicity. This is consistent
with the well known result in the literature of global games.
Anotherfamousresultisthatuniquenessisguaranteedifprivatesignalsaresuf￿ciently
accurate relative to public signals (e.g. (Morris and Shin 2004)). Hence, regarding the
uniqueness, the effects of increasing precision of public signals can be offset by increas-
ing the precision of private signals. In the context of the extended global game model,
Corollary 3 implies that the effect of increasing precision of public signals can be offset
by lowering cost of acquiring private information. In our model with ￿exible information
acquisition, however, Proposition 4 states that there are always in￿nitely many equilibria
whene r D r
4￿￿ > 1, regardless of the precision of public information. That is, the effects
of public information and private information acquisition are disentangled. The reason is
that when informational cost is small, players have enough freedom in coordinating their
attention allocation. And this freedom has nothing to do with public information. There-
fore, the entangled effects in global game models also result from the rigidity imposed
on the information structure.
V. Discussion
In this section, we ￿rst provide a more general informational cost such that our main
results remain valid. We then discuss a related game in which players are endowed
14The assumption of a uniform distribution on R is nonstandard, but presents no technical dif￿culties. As long as
we are only concerned with conditional beliefs, such "improper prior" is well behaved. Here the uniform prior is used
to describe the belief (befor receiving public information) that all states are equally probable. This assumption is not
essential, but facilitates our interpretation of Corollary 4.
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with a capacity to acquire a ￿xed amount of information at no cost. Finally, we address
three extensions to the main model, i.e., a) n ￿ 2 players; b) state-dependent strategic
complementarity r D r .￿/; and c) discontinuous payoff gain (from choosing one action
over the other) with respect to the fundamental and to the proportion of players taking a
speci￿c action.
A. More General Informational Cost
As discussed above, our main results come from players’ ￿exibility in choosing infor-
mation structures. The entropic form of the informational cost is not essential. We adopt
the entropic form because it has a meaningful interpretation under information theory.
The entropic form also allows us to obtain a clear condition r > 4￿, which provides an
intuitive explanation for the emergence of multiple equilibria.
Consider a general informational cost ￿ ￿ c.m/, where ￿ > 0, c.￿/ is a non-negative,
smooth and convex functional de￿ned on ￿ and m has the same interpretation as before.
Under some regularity conditions, we can show that multiple equilibria emerge when
￿ is small enough. Thus our previous qualitative result is preserved under the general
informational cost.
One may doubt that this de￿nition of informational cost is not general enough, since it
onlyaccommodatestheinformationstructureswithbinarysignalsthatcanberepresented
by an m function in ￿. However, if we rank all information structures under Blackwell’s
criterion of garbling16, there would be no loss of generality to focus on information
structures with binary signals.
The convexity of the informational cost follows the fact that randomly mixing informa-
tion structures loses informational content and the resulted information structure should
be less expensive. Let ￿ 2 .0;1/ and m0, m1 be two information structures. Let z be
a Bernoulli random variable independent of the fundamental ￿. It takes value 0 with
16That is, if an information structure is a (strict) garbling ((David Blackwell 1953)) of another one, it conveys (strictly)
less information and should be (strictly) cheaper than the latter.32 MONTH YEAR
probability ￿ and 1 with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Consider an information structure
m D ￿ ￿ m0 C .1 ￿ ￿/ ￿ m1,
which can be thought of as generated by the following process. First, nature chooses
z; then the decision maker receives a signal generated by mz. This mixed information
structure m conveys less information than the case where the decision maker knows the
value of z. Thus the cost c.m/ should be less than
￿ ￿ c.m0/ C .1 ￿ ￿/ ￿ c.m1/,
which is the informational cost for the latter case. Therefore, we justify the convexity.
It is also natural to assume
c.m/ D c.1 ￿ m/,
since m and 1 ￿ m are two information structures that convey the same information
content. Information structure 1 ￿ m can be obtained by exchanging the labels of the
signals of information structure m.
A more concrete generalization that satis￿es the above assumptions is given by
c.m/ D
￿Z
g .m .￿//dP .￿/ ￿ g
￿Z
m .￿/dP .￿/
￿￿
;
where g : [0;1] ! R, g00 > 0, g .x/ D g .1 ￿ x/ and limx!1 g0 .x/ D C1. It is worth
noting that the entropic form is a special case with g .x/ D x lnx C .1 ￿ x/ln.1 ￿ x/.
B. Constrained Information Acquisition Game
In the conventional setup of rational inattention models, the decision maker is capacity
constrained. She is able to acquire information up to a given amount without incurring
any cost. This subsection discusses such case. Let ￿ > 0 denote the maximal amount of
information that can be acquired by players. By an argument similar to that of Lemma
1, player i’s equilibrium strategy is characterized by a function mi 2 L1 .2; P/, and anVOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 33
equilibrium is a pair .m1;m2/ solving the the following problem:
mi 2 arg max
e mi2L1.2;P/
Ui
￿
e mi;m j
￿
s.t. I .e mi/ ￿ ￿;
where i; j 2 f1;2g, i 6D j.
Since payoffs are symmetric and players have the same capacity of information acqui-
sition, all equilibria of this game are symmetric.17 When solving for the equilibrium, the
multiplier for the capacity constraint plays a role similar to ￿, the marginal cost of infor-
mation acquisition in our main model. However, it is worth mentioning two differences.
First, note that the multiplier is an endogenous variable. Its value may vary for different
equilibria. Hence, it is dif￿cult to conduct equilibrium analysis in this setup. Secondly,
the result of Lemma 1 may not hold if ￿ is large enough (e.g. ￿ > 1 bit). Since a binary
decision problem requires at most 1 bit of information, the capacity constraint does not
bind for large ￿. Thus players are able to play switching strategies that violate Lemma
1. This case corresponds to our main model with zero informational cost, and thus has
multiple equilibria.
C. The Game with Multiple Players
We have focused on a 2-player game above, but our arguments also work for games
with multiple players. Suppose now we have n ￿ 2 players. Let N , f1;2;￿ ￿ ￿;ng de-
note the set of players. All the other assumptions remain the same, except that player i 2
N enjoys a payoff ￿￿r￿
￿
1 ￿ n0
n￿1
￿
through choosing "invest" if the fundamental is ￿ and
n0 other players choose "invest". Obviously, Lemma 1 is still applicable here, thus again
playeri’sstrategycanbecharacterizedbymi .￿/ , Pr.player i invest j fundamental D ￿/.
17This symmetry is proved in an earlier version of this paper and is omitted here.34 MONTH YEAR
Given fundamental ￿, player i’s expected payoff from investing is
(16) ￿ ￿ r ￿
 
1 ￿
P
j6Di mi .￿/
n ￿ 1
!
:
An equilibrium of this n-player costly information acquisition game is an n-tuple
.m1;￿ ￿ ￿mn/ solving the the following problem:
mi 2 arg max
e mi2L1.2;P/
Vi .e mi;m￿i/ D Ui .e mi;m￿i/ ￿ ￿ ￿ I .e mi/
s.t. e mi .￿/ 2 [0;1], 8￿ 2 2 .
SimilartotheargumentinProposition3, wecanshowthatallequilibriaaresymmetric.
Thus any equilibrium can be represented by a single function m, and all the remaining
arguments in the main model still work here.
D. State-dependent Strategic Complementarity
A natural extension of the main model is to allow players’ coordination motive to vary
with the fundamental, i.e., r D r .￿/. Under condition r .￿/ > 0 almost surely, the proof
of Lemma 3 is still valid if we simply replace r with r .￿/. Hence the game only admits
symmetric equilibria, and most remaining analysis proceeds as does in the main model.
E. Discontinuous Payoff Gain Function
In our model, the payoff gain from investing over not investing is continuous with re-
spect to the fundamental as well as the opponent’s probability of investing. In many im-
portant applications of global game theory, the payoff gain is discontinuous (e.g., (Morris
and Shin 1998)). This subsection presents an example to illustrate this case.
Follow the notation in (Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin 2001), let ￿ .m;￿/ denote
the payoff gain of choosing "invest" when the fundamental is ￿ and the opponent chooses
"invest" with probability m. For example, in our main model ￿ .m;￿/ D ￿ ￿r ￿.1 ￿ m/,
and @￿
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with respect to m and ￿, @￿
@m D 1 for some .m;￿/, which implies an in￿nite strategic
complementarity. Theintuitiondevelopedinourmainmodelsuggestsmultipleequilibria
no matter how large is ￿, as shown in the following example. The underlying story in
our mind is the currency attack model of (Morris and Shin 1998).
There is a continuum of players playing a costly information acquisition game. Their
payoff gain from choosing "attack" is de￿ned as
￿ .m;￿/ D
8
<
:
￿1 if m < ￿
1 if m ￿ ￿
:
The interpretation of this payoff gain is as following. When the fundamental of the
currency is weak and too many speculators are attacking, government has to drop the
currency peg and each attacker enjoys one dollar. However, when the opposite happens,
the currency attack fails and each attacker loses one dollar. A speculator receive zero if
she does not attack.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a uniform prior over [￿A;1 C A], where A ￿ 0.
Let ￿ > 0 be the marginal cost of information as before. We focus on the symmetric
equilibria, which can be characterized by a mapping m : [￿A;1 C A] ! [0;1]. Since
we are interested in equilibria with information acquisition, we assume
(17)
A
1 C 2A
e￿￿1
C
1 C A
1 C 2A
e￿￿￿1
> 1 .
Then according to Proposition 1, any equilibrium satis￿es
(18) 8￿ 2 [￿A;1 C A];￿ .m;￿/ D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m .￿/
1 ￿ m .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿￿
;
where pI D 1
2￿AC1 ￿
R 1CA
￿A m .￿/ ￿ d￿.
Since ￿ .m;￿/ takes only two possible values, so does m .￿/ according to (18). Thus
the equilibrium strategy can be represented by two numbers m;m 2 [0;1]. Let SI ,
f￿ 2 [￿A;1 C A] : m .￿/ D mg and SN ,
￿
￿ 2 [￿A;1 C A] : m .￿/ D m
￿
denote the36 MONTH YEAR
region of "attack" with "high" probability and "low" probability, respectively. By de￿n-
ition, we have SI ￿ [￿A;m] and SN ￿ .m;1 C A]: Then a symmetric equilibrium is
characterized by m, m, SI ￿ [￿A;m] and SN ￿ .m;1 C A] such that
(19) 1 D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m
1 ￿ m
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿￿
;
(20) ￿1 D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m
1 ￿ m
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿￿
;
and
(21) pI D
1
2 ￿ A C 1
￿
￿
Pr.SI/ ￿ m C Pr.SN/ ￿ m
￿
:
PROPOSITION 7: This game with discontinuous payoff gain has in￿nitely many equi-
libria for all ￿ > 0.
PROOF:
See Appendix D.
This proposition con￿rms our intuition learnt from the main model. Discontinuous
payoff gain generates in￿nite strategic complementarity. Therefore, coordination motive
always dominates and in￿nitely many ways of information acquisition can be supported
in equilibrium.
REFERENCES
Blackwell, David. 1953. ￿Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments.￿ The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, 24(2): pp. 265￿272.
Carlsson, Hans, and Eric van Damme. 1993. ￿Global Games and Equilibrium Selec-
tion.￿ Econometrica, 61(5): 989￿1018.
Cover, Thomas M., and Joy A. Thomas. 1991. Elements of information theory. New
York, NY, USA:Wiley-Interscience.VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 37
Frankel, David M., Stephen Morris, and Ady Pauzner. 2003. ￿Equilibrium selec-
tion in global games with strategic complementarities.￿ Journal of Economic Theory,
108(1): 1 ￿ 44.
Goldstein, Itay, and Ady Pauzner. 2005. ￿Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Proba-
bility of Bank Runs.￿ The Journal of Finance, 60(3): pp. 1293￿1327.
Hellwig, Christian, and Laura Veldkamp. 2009. ￿Knowing What Others Know: Coor-
dination Motives in Information Acquisition.￿ Review of Economic Studies, 76(1): 223￿
251.
Mackowiak, Bartosz, and Mirko Wiederholt. 2009. ￿Optimal Sticky Prices under Ra-
tional Inattention.￿ American Economic Review, 99(3): 769￿803.
Matejka, Filip. 2010. ￿Rigid Pricing and Rationally Inattentive Consumer.￿ The Center
for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague CERGE-
EI Working Papers wp409.
Milgrom, Paul R. 1981. ￿Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications.￿ The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2): pp. 380￿391.
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. 1998. ￿Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-
Ful￿lling Currency Attacks.￿ The American Economic Review, 88(3): pp. 587￿597.
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. 2001. ￿Global Games: Theory and Applica-
tions.￿ Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Cowles Foun-
dation Discussion Papers 1275R.
Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. 2004. ￿Coordination risk and the price of debt.￿
European Economic Review, 48(1): 133 ￿ 153.
Sims, Christopher A. 1998. ￿Stickiness.￿ Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy, 49(1): 317￿356.
Sims, Christopher A. 2003. ￿Implications of rational inattention.￿ Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50(3):665￿690.SwissNationalBank/StudyCenterGerzenseeConference
on Monetary Policy under Incomplete Information.38 MONTH YEAR
Sims, Christopher A. 2005. ￿Rational inattention: a research agenda.￿ Deutsche Bun-
desbank, Research Centre Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2005,34.
Woodford, Michael. 2008. ￿Inattention as a source of randomized discrete adjustment.￿
Columbia University Unpublished working paper.
Woodford, Michael. 2009. ￿Information-constrained state-dependent pricing.￿ Journal
of Monetary Economics, 56(Supplement 1): S100 ￿ S124. Supplement issue: Decem-
ber 12-13, 2008 Research Conference on ’Monetary Policy under Imperfect Informa-
tion’ Sponsored by the Swiss National Bank (http://www.snb.ch) and Study Center
Gerzensee (www.szgerzensee.ch).
Yang, Ming. 2011. ￿Optimality of Securitized Debt with Endogenous and Flexible In-
formation Acquisition.￿ Princeton Economic Theory Center Working Paper 019 2011.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1.
PROOF:
Suppose ..Si;qi/;￿i/ is player i’s equilibrium strategy. Construct a new strategy
￿￿e Si;e qi
￿
;e ￿i
￿
with e Si D
￿
si;I;si;N;si;ind
￿
such that
8￿ 2 2;
e qi
￿
si;Ij￿
￿
D
Z
Si;I
qi .sij￿/dsi;
e qi
￿
si;Nj￿
￿
D
Z
Si;N
qi .sij￿/dsi;
e qi
￿
si;indj￿
￿
D
Z
Si;ind
qi .sij￿/dsi;
and
e ￿i
￿
si;I
￿
D 1;
e ￿i
￿
si;N
￿
D 0;
e ￿i
￿
si;ind
￿
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Since player i is indifferent between invest and not invest upon Si;ind, we have
Ui
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
D Ui
￿￿￿e Si;e qi
￿
;e ￿i
￿
;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
:
However, if #.Si/ > 3,
￿e Si;e qi
￿
incurs strictly less mutual information than does .Si;qi/,
i.e., I .e qi/ ￿ I .qi/ < 0. The reason is that
￿e Si;e qi
￿
does not require player i to discern
signal realizations within any of Si;I, Si;N, and Si;ind. Then
vi
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
￿ vi
￿￿￿e Si;e qi
￿
;e ￿i
￿
;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
D Ui
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ I .qi/
￿Ui
￿￿￿e Si;e qi
￿
;e ￿i
￿
;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
C ￿ ￿ I .e qi/
D ￿ ￿
￿
I .e qi/ ￿ I .qi/
￿
< 0;
i.e., ..Si;qi/;￿i/ is suboptimal and cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Thus we proved
that in any equilibrium, 8i 2 f1;2g, #.Si/ ￿ 3, Si;I D
￿
si;I
￿
, Si;N D
￿
si;N
￿
, and
Si;ind D
￿
si;ind
￿
.
Now we prove 8i 2 f1;2g, Pr
￿
Si;ind
￿
D 0 (i.e., Pr
￿
si;ind
￿
D 0).
Suppose 9i 2 f1;2g, Pr
￿
Si;ind
￿
> 0 (thus, Pr
￿
si;ind
￿
> 0). If Pr
￿
si;ind
￿
2 .0;1/, then
Pr
￿
si;I
￿
> 0 or Pr
￿
si;N
￿
> 0. Without loss of generality, let Pr
￿
si;I
￿
> 0. Construct a
new strategy
￿￿
Si;qi
￿
;￿i
￿
with Si D
￿
si;I;si;N
￿
such that 8￿ 2 2,
qi
￿
si;Ij￿
￿
D qi
￿
si;Ij￿
￿
C qi
￿
si;indj￿
￿
;
qi
￿
si;Nj￿
￿
D qi
￿
si;Nj￿
￿
;
￿i
￿
si;I;ai D 1
￿
D 1
and
￿i
￿
si;N;ai D 0
￿
D 1 .40 MONTH YEAR
Since player i is indifferent between invest and not invest upon receiving si;ind, we have
Ui
￿
..Si;qi/;￿i/;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
D Ui
￿￿￿
Si;qi
￿
;￿i
￿
;
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿￿
.
Since Pr
￿
si;I
￿
> 0 and Pr
￿
si;ind
￿
> 0, this new strategy
￿￿
Si;qi
￿
;￿i
￿
incurs strictly less
mutual information then does ..Si;qi/;￿i/. Then by the same argument, we know that
..Si;qi/;￿i/ is suboptimal and cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
Now the only possibility is Pr
￿
si;ind
￿
D 1, i.e., player i does not acquire any infor-
mation in equilibrium since she is always indifferent between invest and not invest. Let
mi .￿/ , Pr.ai D 1j￿/ be the probability that player i invests when fundamental equals
￿. Then mi is totally determined by player i’s strategy ..Si;qi/;￿i/. Pr
￿
si;ind
￿
D 1 im-
plies that in equilibrium, Pr
￿
￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿
D 0
￿
D 1, and 9m 2 [0;1], s.t. player
i always invests with probability m, i.e., Pr.mi .￿/ D m/ D 1. Let
FC D f￿ 2 2j￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/ > 0g;
F￿ D f￿ 2 2j￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/ < 0g
and
B D f￿ 2 2j￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/ D 0g:
Since common prior P is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, we
have Pr.B/ D 0, i.e., Pr.FC/ C Pr.F￿/ D 1. Without loss of generality, assume
Pr.FC/ > 0. Construct a new strategy
￿￿e Sj;e qj
￿
;e ￿ j
￿
for player j, s.t.
e Sj D f0;1g;
e qj
￿
sj D 1j￿
￿
D 1 if ￿ 2 FC [ B;
e qj
￿
sj D 0j￿
￿
D 1 if ￿ 2 F￿VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 41
and
e ￿ j
￿
sj D 1
￿
D 1, e ￿ j
￿
sj D 0
￿
D 0 .
Note that 8￿ 2 FC,
￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/ > 0 D ￿ ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿
;
i.e.,
m j .￿/ < mi ￿ 1 .
Then we have
Uj
￿￿￿e Sj;e qj
￿
;e ￿ j
￿
;..Si;qi/;￿i/
￿
￿ Uj
￿￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿
;..Si;qi/;￿i/
￿
D
Z
FC[B
1 ￿ [￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/] ￿ dP .￿/ C
Z
F￿
0 ￿ [￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/] ￿ dP .￿/
￿
Z
m j .￿/ ￿ [￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/] ￿ dP .￿/
￿
Z
FC
￿
1 ￿ m j .￿/
￿
￿ [￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m/] ￿ dP .￿/
> 0
On the other hand, it is obvious that I
￿
e qj
￿
￿ I
￿
qj
￿
. Therefore,
￿￿e Sj;e qj
￿
;e ￿ j
￿
strictly
dominates
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿
and thus
￿￿
Sj;qj
￿
;￿ j
￿
cannot be player j’s equilibrium strat-
egy.
Now we proved 8i 2 f1;2g, Pr
￿
Si;ind
￿
D 0 by contradiction. Together with the
previous result that 8i 2 f1;2g, #.Si/ ￿ 3, it also implies that #.Si/ D 1 or 2.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 3.
PROOF:42 MONTH YEAR
According to (10),
8￿ 2 2,
￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m1 .￿// D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m2 .￿/
1 ￿ m2 .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI2
1 ￿ pI2
￿￿
; (B1)
￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ m2 .￿// D ￿ ￿
￿
ln
￿
m1 .￿/
1 ￿ m1 .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI1
1 ￿ pI1
￿￿
: (B2)
(B1) and (B2) imply
8￿ 2 2,
￿
ln
￿
pI2
1 ￿ pI2
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI1
1 ￿ pI1
￿ ￿
D
￿
ln
￿
m2 .￿/
1 ￿ m2 .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
m1 .￿/
1 ￿ m1 .￿/
￿￿
C
r
￿
.m2 .￿/ ￿ m1 .￿//: (B3)
If pI2 D pI1, (B3) becomes
8￿ 2 2,
0 D
￿
ln
￿
m2 .￿/
1 ￿ m2 .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
m1 .￿/
1 ￿ m1 .￿/
￿￿
C
r
￿
.m2 .￿/ ￿ m1 .￿//;
and we must have m2 .￿/ D m1 .￿/ a:s: since r
￿ > 0. Now suppose pI2 6D pI1. Without
loss of generality, let pI2 > pI1. Denote
z D ln
￿
pI2
1 ￿ pI2
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI1
1 ￿ pI1
￿
> 0 .
Then (B3) becomes
(B4)
￿
ln
￿
m2 .￿/
1 ￿ m2 .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
m1 .￿/
1 ￿ m1 .￿/
￿￿
C
r
￿
.m2 .￿/ ￿ m1 .￿// D z > 0;
whichsuggeststhatPr.m2 .￿/ > m1 .￿// D 1. Letln
￿
m2.￿/
1￿m2.￿/
￿
D x .￿/andln
￿
m1.￿/
1￿m1.￿/
￿
D
y .￿/. (B4) implies
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Note that pIi D
R
mi .￿/ ￿ dP .￿/ D Emi .￿/ for i 2 f1;2g,
m2 .￿/ D
exp.x .￿//
1 C exp.x .￿//
and m1 .￿/ D
exp.y .￿//
1 C exp.y .￿//
,
thus
z D ln
￿
Em2 .￿/
1 ￿ Em2 .￿/
￿
￿ ln
￿
Em1 .￿/
1 ￿ Em1 .￿/
￿
D ln
0
@
E
h
exp.x.￿//
1Cexp.x.￿//
i
E
h
1
1Cexp.x.￿//
i
1
A ￿ ln
0
@
E
h
exp.y.￿//
1Cexp.y.￿//
i
E
h
1
1Cexp.y.￿//
i
1
A
< ln
0
@
E
h
exp.y.￿/Cz/
1Cexp.y.￿/Cz/
i
E
h
1
1Cexp.y.￿/Cz/
i
1
A ￿ ln
0
@
E
h
exp.y.￿//
1Cexp.y.￿//
i
E
h
1
1Cexp.y.￿//
i
1
A:
Take the exponential of both sides of the above inequality, we have
exp.z/ <
E
h
exp.y.￿/Cz/
1Cexp.y.￿/Cz/
i
￿ E
h
1
1Cexp.y.￿//
i
E
h
1
1Cexp.y.￿/Cz/
i
￿ E
h
exp.y.￿//
1Cexp.y.￿//
i;
i.e.,
E
￿
exp.y .￿//
1 C exp.y .￿/ C z/
￿
￿E
￿
1
1 C exp.y .￿//
￿
> E
￿
1
1 C exp.y .￿/ C z/
￿
￿E
￿
exp.y .￿//
1 C exp.y .￿//
￿
;
i.e.,
Z
exp.y .￿1//dP .￿1/
1 C exp.y .￿1/ C z/
￿
Z
dP .￿2/
1 C exp.y .￿2//
C
Z
exp.y .￿2//dP .￿2/
1 C exp.y .￿2/ C z/
￿
Z
dP .￿1/
1 C exp.y .￿1//
>
Z
dP .￿1/
1 C exp.y .￿1/ C z/
￿
Z
exp.y .￿2//dP .￿2/
1 C exp.y .￿2//
C
Z
dP .￿2/
1 C exp.y .￿2/ C z/
￿
Z
exp.y .￿1//dP .￿1/
1 C exp.y .￿1//
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i.e.,
(B5) Z
[A C B ￿ C ￿ D]dP .￿1/dP .￿2/
￿
1 C exp.y .￿1/ C z/
￿￿
1 C exp.y .￿2//
￿￿
1 C exp.y .￿2/ C z/
￿￿
1 C exp.y .￿1//
￿ > 0;
where
A D exp.y .￿1//
￿
1 C exp.y .￿2/ C z/
￿￿
1 C exp.y .￿1//
￿
;
B D exp.y .￿2//
￿
1 C exp.y .￿1/ C z/
￿￿
1 C exp.y .￿2//
￿
;
C D exp.y .￿2//
￿
1 C exp.y .￿2/ C z/
￿￿
1 C exp.y .￿1//
￿
and
D D exp.y .￿1//
￿
1 C exp.y .￿1/ C z/
￿￿
1 C exp.y .￿2//
￿
:
Let y .￿1/ D u and y .￿2/ D v, then the numerator in the integral becomes
A C B ￿ C ￿ D D
￿
eu ￿ ev￿2 ￿
1 ￿ ez￿
< 0;
where the last inequality follows the fact that z > 0. Therefore, the left hand side of (B5)
is strictly negative, which is a contradiction. Therefore, Pr.m1 .￿/ D m2 .￿// D 1.
LEMMA 3: The costly information acquisition game has an equilibrium with at least
one player always investing if and only if Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
￿ 1, where the expectation is
taken according to common prior P.
PROOF:
(Suf￿ciency.) Since
f .x/ D x￿1
is a strictly convex function for x > 0, Jensen’s inequality implies
￿
Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿￿￿1
￿ Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
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This inequality holds strictly since distribution P is not a singleton. Thus
￿
Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿￿￿1
< Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
￿ 1,
i.e.,
Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
> 1 .
If m j .￿/ D 1 almost surely, player i’s payoff gain from investing over not investing
becomes
1ui .￿/ D ￿ .
Then according to iii) of Proposition 1,
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
￿ 1
and
Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
> 1
imply mi .￿/ D 1 almost surely, which in turn con￿rms that m j .￿/ D 1 almost surely is
player j’s optimal strategy. Therefore, we have an equilibrium with both players always
investing.
(Necessity.) Suppose m j .￿/ D 1 almost surely, but Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
> 1. Player i’s
payoff gain from investing over not investing is
1ui .￿/ D ￿ .
According to ii) and iv) of Proposition 1, Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
> 1 implies mi .￿/ < 1 almost
surely. Then player j’s payoff gain from investing over not investing becomes
1u j .￿/ D ￿ ￿ r ￿ [1 ￿ mi .￿/]
< ￿ almost surely,46 MONTH YEAR
which implies
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿11u j .￿/
￿
> Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
> 1 .
Thus according to ii) and iv) of Proposition 1, we ￿nd m j .￿/ < 1 almost surely, which
is a contradiction.
LEMMA 4: In an equilibrium of the costly information acquisition game with one
player always investing, the other player must also always invest.
PROOF:
By the necessity part of Lemma 3, we know that Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
￿ 1. Then the
suf￿ciency part of Lemma 3 has already proved that the other player must also always
invest.
PROPOSITION 8: The costly information acquisition game has an equilibrium with
both players always investing if and only if Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
￿ 1.
PROOF:
This proposition is a direct implication of Lemma 3 and 4.
LEMMA 5: The costly information acquisition game has an equilibrium with at least
one player always not investing if and only if Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
￿ e￿￿1r, where the expecta-
tion is taken according to common prior P.
PROOF:
(Suf￿ciency.) Note that
Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
￿ e￿￿1r
is equivalent to
Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
￿ 1 .VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 47
Since
f .x/ D x￿1
is a strictly convex function for x > 0, Jensen’s inequality implies
￿
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿￿￿1
￿ Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
.
This inequality holds strictly since distribution P is not a singleton. Thus
￿
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿￿￿1
< Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
￿ 1,
i.e.,
￿
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿￿
> 1 .
If m j .￿/ D 0 almost surely, player i’s payoff gain from investing over not investing
becomes
1ui .￿/ D ￿ ￿ r .
Then according to iv) of Proposition 1,
Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
￿ 1
and
￿
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿￿
> 1
imply mi .￿/ D 0 almost surely, which in turn con￿rms that m j .￿/ D 0 almost surely is
player j’s optimal strategy. Therefore, we have an equilibrium with both players always
not investing.
(Necessity.) Suppose m j .￿/ D 0 almost surely, but Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
> e￿￿1r, i.e.,
Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
> 1. Player i’s payoff gain from investing over not investing is
1ui .￿/ D ￿ ￿ r .48 MONTH YEAR
According to ii) and iii) of Proposition 1, Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
> 1 implies mi .￿/ > 0
almost surely. Then player j’s payoff gain from investing over not investing becomes
1u j .￿/ D ￿ ￿ r ￿ [1 ￿ mi .￿/]
> ￿ ￿ r almost surely,
which implies
Eexp
￿
￿￿11u j .￿/
￿
> Eexp
￿
￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/
￿
> 1 .
Thus according to ii) and iii) of Proposition 1, we ￿nd m j .￿/ > 0 almost surely, which
is a contradiction.
LEMMA 6: In an equilibrium of the costly information acquisition game with one
player always not investing, the other player must always not invest either.
PROOF:
By the necessity part of Lemma 5, we know that Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
￿ e￿￿1r. Then the
suf￿ciency part of Lemma 5 has already proved that the other player must always not
invest either.
PROPOSITION 9: The costly information acquisition game has an equilibrium with
both players always not investing if and only if Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
￿ e￿￿1r.
PROOF:
This proposition is a direct implication of Lemma 5 and 6.
APPENDIX C
Proof of Lemma 2.
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Let m 2 M.r;￿/ be an arbitrary shape. Let ￿0 .pI/ be de￿ned by (13) and
m .￿; pI/ D m .￿ ￿ ￿0 .pI// .
By de￿nition, m .￿; pI/ satis￿es
(C1) ￿￿r￿.1 ￿ m .￿; pI// D ￿￿
￿
ln
￿
m .￿; pI/
1 ￿ m .￿; pI/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿￿
almost surely.
Here pI 2 .0;1/ is treated as an index and m .￿; pI/ is an equilibrium if and only if
(C2) pI D
Z
2
m .￿; pI/dP .￿/ .
Therefore, our objective is to show the existence of pI 2 .0;1/ satisfying (C2).
Step 1. We show Z
2
m .￿; pI/dP .￿/ < pI
for pI suf￿ciently close to 1.
By (C1),
ln
￿
m .￿; pI/
1 ￿ m .￿; pI/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿
< ￿￿1￿ almost surely,
i.e.,
m .￿; pI/ <
pI
1￿pI
e￿￿￿1￿ C
pI
1￿pI
almost surely.
Thus it suf￿ces to show
Z
2
pI
1￿pI
e￿￿￿1￿ C
pI
1￿pI
dP .￿/ ￿ pI .
Let
w D
1
1 ￿ pI50 MONTH YEAR
and
v .￿/ D e￿￿￿1￿ ￿ 1,
then it suf￿ces to show
(C3)
Z
2
w ￿ 1
v .￿/ C w
dP .￿/ ￿
w ￿ 1
w
.
Since w > 1 by de￿nition, (C3) becomes
(C4)
Z
2
1
1 C v .￿/=w
dP .￿/ ￿ 1 .
By assumption, Z
2
e￿￿￿1￿dP .￿/ > 1,
i.e.,
(C5)
Z
2
v .￿/dP .￿/ > 0 .
Hence there exists N > 0 s.t.
Z
2\[￿N;C1/
v .￿/dP .￿/ > 0 .
Let
B D max
￿
e￿￿1N ￿ 1;1
￿
,
then
jv .￿/j ￿ B
for all ￿ 2 [￿N;C1/. Since
1
1 C x
D 1 ￿ x C x2 C o
￿
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for x close enough to zero, there exists w > 0 s.t.
1
1 C v .￿/=w
< 1 ￿
v .￿/
w
C
2B2
w2
for all ￿ 2 [￿N;C1/ and w > w. Choose
(C6) w > max
 
w;
2B2
R
2\[￿N;C1/ v .￿/dP .￿/
!
,
then
Z
2\[￿N;C1/
1
1 C v .￿/=w
dP .￿/
<
Z
2\[￿N;C1/
￿
1 ￿
v .￿/
w
C
2B2
w2
￿
dP .￿/
D Pr.￿ ￿ ￿N/ C
2B2
w2 ￿ Pr.￿ ￿ ￿N/ ￿ w￿1
Z
2\[￿N;C1/
v .￿/dP .￿/
￿ Pr.￿ ￿ ￿N/ C
2B2
w2 ￿ w￿1
Z
2\[￿N;C1/
v .￿/dP .￿/
< Pr.￿ ￿ ￿N/, (C7)
where the last inequality follows (C6). Hence,
Z
2
1
1 C v .￿/=w
dP .￿/
D
Z
2\[￿N;C1/
1
1 C v .￿/=w
dP .￿/ C
Z
2\.￿1;￿N/
1
1 C v .￿/=w
dP .￿/
￿
Z
2\[￿N;C1/
1
1 C v .￿/=w
dP .￿/ C
Z
2\.￿1;￿N/
1 ￿ dP .￿/
< Pr.￿ ￿ ￿N/ C Pr.￿ < ￿N/
D 1,
where the ￿rst inequality holds since v .￿/ for all ￿ 2 .￿1;￿N/ and the last inequality52 MONTH YEAR
comes from (C7). Therefore, (C4) holds and if we let
pI D
w ￿ 1
w
,
we have Z
2
m
￿
￿; pI
￿
dP .￿/ < pI .
Step 2. We show Z
2
m .￿; pI/dP .￿/ > pI
for pI suf￿ciently close to 0.
By (C1),
ln
￿
m .￿; pI/
1 ￿ m .￿; pI/
￿
￿ ln
￿
pI
1 ￿ pI
￿
> ￿￿1 .￿ ￿ r/ almost surely,
i.e.,
1 ￿ m .￿; pI/ <
1
1 C e￿￿1.￿￿r/ pI
1￿pI
almost surely.
Thus it suf￿ces to show
Z
2
1
1 C e￿￿1.￿￿r/ pI
1￿pI
dP .￿/ ￿ 1 ￿ pI .
Let
w D
1
pI
and
v .￿/ D e￿￿1.￿￿r/ ￿ 1,
then it suf￿ces to show
(C8)
Z
2
w ￿ 1
v .￿/ C w
dP .￿/ ￿
w ￿ 1
w
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By assumption, Z
2
e￿￿1.￿￿r/dP .￿/ > 1,
i.e.,
(C9)
Z
2
v .￿/dP .￿/ > 0 .
Note that (C8) and (C9) are the same as (C4) and (C5), thus (C8) can be proved by the
same argument in Step 1. Therefore, we can ￿nd a p
I 2 .0;1/ s.t.
Z
2
m
￿
￿; p
I
￿
dP .￿/ > p
I .
Step 3. Since common prior P is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure over R, Z
2
m .￿; pI/dP .￿/ ￿ pI
is a continuous function of pI 2 .0;1/. Thus Step 1 and Step 2 imply the existence of
p￿
I 2 .0;1/ s.t. Z
2
m
￿
￿; p￿
I
￿
dP .￿/ D p￿
I .
According to (13), let
￿￿
0 D r=2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ln
￿
p￿
I
1 ￿ p￿
I
￿
,
then m
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
0
￿
is an equilibrium with shape m. This concludes the proof.
LEMMA 7: Let P beanyprobabilitymeasureoverR. Asetoffunctions M ￿ L1 .R; P/
is relatively compact if M is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous.
PROOF:
Let B > 0 be the uniform bound and fmng1
nD1 ￿ M be a sequence of functions. Let
AT D
￿
￿T;￿T C
1
T
;￿T C
2
T
;￿ ￿ ￿;T ￿
2
T
;T ￿
1
T
;
￿
,54 MONTH YEAR
then [1
TD1AT is dense in R. Since [1
TD1AT is countable, we can list its elements as
f￿1;￿2;￿3;￿ ￿ ￿g. Notethatthenumericalsequencefmn .￿1/g1
nD1 isbounded, sobyBolzano-
Weierstrass theorem it has a convergent subsequence, which we will write using double
subscripts:
￿
m1;n .￿1/
￿1
nD1. Now the numerical sequence
￿
m1;n .￿2/
￿1
nD1 is also bounded,
so it has a convergent subsequence
￿
m2;n .￿2/
￿1
nD1. Note that the sequence of functions
￿
m2;n
￿1
nD1 converges at both ￿1 and ￿2 since it is a subsequence of
￿
m1;n
￿1
nD1. Proceeding
in this fashion we obtain a countable collection of subsequences of our original sequence:
m1;1 m1;2 m1;3 ￿ ￿ ￿
m2;1 m2;2 m2;3 ￿ ￿ ￿
m3;1 m3;2 m3;3 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
,
where the sequence in the n-th row converges at the points ￿1;￿2;￿￿￿;￿n and each row is a
subsequence of the one above it. Thus the diagonal sequence
￿
mn;n
￿1
nD1 is a subsequence
of the original sequence fmng1
nD1 that converges at each point of [1
TD1AT. Now we show
that
￿
mn;n
￿1
nD1 is a Cauchy sequence in L1 .R; P/.
For any " > 0, there exists T0 such that
(C10) Pr.[￿T0;T0]/ ￿ 1 ￿
"
5 ￿ B
,
where B is the uniform bound such that jm .￿/j < B for all ￿ 2 2 and m 2 M. Since M
is equicontinuous, there exists T1 > T0 such that 8m 2 M, 8￿1;￿2 2 2,
j￿1 ￿ ￿2j <
1
T1
implies
jm .￿1/ ￿ m .￿2/j <
"
5
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As AT1 is ￿nite and
￿
mn;n
￿1
nD1 converges at every point of AT1, there exists n0 2 N such
that
￿
￿mn;n .￿/ ￿ mn0;n0 .￿/
￿
￿ <
"
5
for all n;n0 > n0 and all ￿ 2 AT1. For any y 2 [￿T1;T1], there exists ￿ 2 AT1 such that
jy ￿ ￿j <
1
T1
,
thus we have
￿
￿mn;n .y/ ￿ mn;n .￿/
￿
￿ <
"
5
and
￿ ￿mn0;n0 .y/ ￿ mn0;n0 .￿/
￿ ￿ <
"
5
.
Hence for any y 2 [￿T1;T1] and n;n0 > n0,
￿
￿mn0;n0 .y/ ￿ mn;n .y/
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿mn0;n0 .y/ ￿ mn0;n0 .￿/
￿
￿ C
￿
￿mn0;n0 .￿/ ￿ mn;n .￿/
￿
￿ C
￿
￿mn;n .￿/ ￿ mn;n .y/
￿
￿
<
3 ￿ "
5
.
(C11)
Then
￿
￿mn0;n0 ￿ mn;n
￿
￿
L1.R;P/
D
Z
2
￿ ￿mn0;n0 .y/ ￿ mn;n .y/
￿ ￿dP .y/
D
Z
[￿T1;T1]
￿ ￿mn0;n0 .y/ ￿ mn;n .y/
￿ ￿dP .y/ C
Z
2n[￿T1;T1]
￿ ￿mn0;n0 .y/ ￿ mn;n .y/
￿
￿dP .y/
<
3 ￿ "
5
￿ Pr.[￿T1;T1]/ C
Z
2n[￿T1;T1]
2 ￿ B ￿ dP .y/
￿
3 ￿ "
5
￿ 1 C
"
5 ￿ B
￿ 2 ￿ B
D " ,56 MONTH YEAR
where the ￿rst inequality follows (C11) and the second inequality comes from (C10).
Therefore,
￿
mn;n
￿1
nD1 is a Cauchy subsequence of fmng1
nD1 in L1 .R; P/ and M is rel-
atively compact in L1 .R; P/. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.
PROOF:
We prove by contradiction. Suppose the proposition does not hold, then 9i 2 f1;2g,
￿i > 0 and a sequence fcng1
nD1 s.t. limn!1 cn D 0 and 8n;￿i .cn/ ￿ ￿i.
We write g￿ for the density function over signals induced by precision ￿, i.e.,
g￿ .x/ D
Z
￿
￿1=2 ￿ f
￿
￿1=2 .x ￿ ￿/
￿
￿ p.￿/ ￿ d￿;
and write l￿ .￿jx/ for the induced posterior density over ￿:
l￿ .￿jx/ D
￿1=2 ￿ f
￿
￿1=2 .x ￿ ￿/
￿
￿ p.￿/
g￿ .x/
:
A suf￿cient statistic for a player j’s conjecture over i’s play is the probability she
attaches to player i investing as a function of ￿, which is a function mi : 2![0;1]. Let
S , fs Lebesgue measurable : 8x 2 R;s .x/ 2 [0;1]g
and
M￿i ,
￿
m 2 ￿ : 9￿ 2
￿
0;￿i
￿
and s 2 S; s.t. m .￿/ D
Z
x
￿1=2 f
￿
￿1=2 .x ￿ ￿/
￿
s .x/dx for all ￿ 2 2
￿
;
where ￿ D
￿
m 2 L1 .2; P/ : 8￿ 2 2, m .￿/ 2 [0;1]
￿
. M￿i contains all player j’s pos-
sible conjectures of player i’s play when ￿i 2
￿
0;￿i
￿
.
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Let f 0 denote the derivative of f . f 0 could be a generalized function. Since f 0 is
Lebesgue integrable over R,
Z
y
max
￿
f 0 .y/;0
￿
dy < 1
and Z
y
max
￿
￿ f 0 .y/;0
￿
dy < 1
hold by de￿nition. 8m 2 M￿i, 8￿ 2 2,
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
dm .￿/
d￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ D
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
Z
x
￿ ￿ f 0 ￿
￿1=2 .x ￿ ￿/
￿
￿ s .x/ ￿ dx
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
D
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
Z
y
￿1=2 ￿ f 0 .y/ ￿ s
￿
￿￿1=2 ￿ y C ￿
￿
￿ dy
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿1=2 ￿ max
￿Z
y
max
￿
f 0 .y/;0
￿
dy;
Z
y
max
￿
￿ f 0 .y/;0
￿
dy
￿
.
Thus for any " > 0,
j￿1 ￿ ￿2j <
"
￿1=2 ￿ max
hR
y max. f 0 .y/;0/dy;
R
y max.￿ f 0 .y/;0/dy
i
implies
jm .￿1/ ￿ m .￿2/j < "
for all m 2 M￿i, i.e., M￿i is equicontinuous. By de￿nition, 8m 2 M￿i, 8￿ 2 2,
jm .￿/j ￿ 1, i.e., M￿i is uniformly bounded. Therefore, according to Lemma 7, M￿i is
relatively compact in ￿.
If player j chooses
￿
￿ j;sj
￿
against conjecture mi, her expected utility is
Vj
￿
￿ j;sj;mi
￿
D
Z
x j
sj
￿
x j
￿
￿
￿Z
￿
.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿/// ￿ l￿ j
￿
￿jx j
￿
￿ d￿
￿
￿g￿ j
￿
x j
￿
￿dx j .58 MONTH YEAR
With an optimal choice of sj this gives
V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;mi
￿
D
Z
x j
max
￿
0;
Z
￿
.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿/// ￿ l￿ j
￿
￿jx j
￿
￿ d￿
￿
￿ g￿ j
￿
x j
￿
￿ dx j
D
Z
x j
max
￿
0;
Z
￿
.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿/// ￿ ￿
1=2
j f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
p.￿/d￿
￿
￿ dx j .
(C12)
Note that lim￿!1 ￿1=2 ￿ f
￿
￿1=2 .x ￿ ￿/
￿
D ￿ .x ￿ ￿/, where ￿ .￿/ is the Dirac delta
function. Then (C12) implies
V ￿￿
j .mi/ , lim
￿ j!1
V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;mi
￿
D
Z
x j
max
￿
0;
￿
x j ￿ r ￿
￿
1 ￿ mi
￿
x j
￿￿￿
￿ p
￿
x j
￿￿
￿ dx j
D
Z
￿
maxf0;[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//] ￿ p.￿/g ￿ d￿ . (C13)
V ￿￿
j .mi/ is player j’s ex ante expected utility against conjecture mi if she can always
observe the exact realization of the fundamental.
Step 2: We show that 8mi 2 ￿, 8￿ j > 0, V ￿￿
j .mi/ > V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;mi
￿
.
Note that our assumptions
Eexp
￿
￿￿￿1￿
￿
> 1
and
Eexp
￿
￿￿1￿
￿
> e￿￿1r
imply that
Pr.￿ < 0/ > 0
and
Pr.￿ > r/ > 0 ,VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 59
respectively. Thus we have
Pr.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿// > 0/
￿ Pr.￿ ￿ r > 0/
> 0
and
Pr.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿// < 0/
￿ Pr.￿ < 0/
> 0 .
Since function maxf0;￿g is convex, Jensen’s inequality implies that
max
￿
0;
Z
￿
[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//] ￿ ￿
1=2
j ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿ p.￿/d￿
￿
￿
Z
￿
max
n
0;[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//] ￿ ￿
1=2
j ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿o
￿ p.￿/d￿
D
Z
￿
maxf0;[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//]g ￿ ￿
1=2
j ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿ p.￿/d￿ . (C14)
Since
Pr
￿
[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//] ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
> 0
￿
D Pr.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿// > 0/
> 060 MONTH YEAR
and
Pr
￿
[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//] ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
< 0
￿
D Pr.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿// < 0/
> 0
for all x j 2 R, (C14) holds strictly. Then, (C12) implies
V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;mi
￿
D
Z
x j
max
￿
0;
Z
￿
[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//] ￿ ￿
1=2
j ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿ p.￿/ ￿ d￿
￿
￿ dx j
<
Z
x j
Z
￿
maxf0;[￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿//]g ￿ ￿
1=2
j ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿ p.￿/ ￿ d￿ ￿ dx j
D
Z
￿
maxf0;.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿/// ￿ p.￿/g ￿
Z
x j
￿
1=2
j ￿ f
￿
￿
1=2
j
￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿ dx j ￿ d￿
D
Z
￿
maxf0;.￿ ￿ r ￿ .1 ￿ mi .￿/// ￿ p.￿/g ￿ 1 ￿ d￿
D V ￿￿
j .mi/;
where the last equality follows (C13). Therefore,
(C15) 8mi 2 ￿, 8￿ j > 0, V ￿￿
j .mi/ > V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;mi
￿
:
Step 3: We prove limn!1 ￿ j .cn/ D 1.
If this is not true, there exists a ￿ j > 0 and a subsequence
￿
cnk
￿1
kD1 ￿ fcng1
nD1 s.t.
limk!1 ￿ j
￿
cnk
￿
D ￿ j.
We ￿rst show 8￿ j > 0; 9￿0
j > 0 and ￿
￿
￿ j;￿0
j
￿
> 0, s.t. 8mi 2 M￿i,
V ￿
j
￿
￿0
j;mi
￿
￿ V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;mi
￿
> ￿
￿
￿ j;￿0
j
￿
.
Otherwise, 9￿ j > 0;8￿0
j > 0, 8l 2 N, 9ml
￿ j;￿0
j
2 M￿i, s.t.
V ￿
j
￿
￿0
j;ml
￿ j;￿0
j
￿
￿ V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;ml
￿ j;￿0
j
￿
￿ 1=l .VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 61
Thus 8￿0
j > 0, there exists a m￿ j;￿0
j 2 ￿ and a subsequence
n
lk;￿ j;￿0
j
o1
kD1
s.t.
lim
k!1
m
lk;￿ j;￿0
j
￿0
j
D m￿ j;￿0
j
and
V ￿
j
￿
￿0
j;m￿ j;￿0
j
￿
￿ V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;m￿ j;￿0
j
￿
￿ 0;
since M￿i is relatively compact and V ￿
j .￿;m/ is a continuous functional of m for all
￿ > 0. However, (C15) implies that
V ￿
j
￿
￿0
j;m￿ j;￿0
j
￿
￿ V ￿
j
￿
￿ j;m￿ j;￿0
j
￿
> 0
for ￿0
j large enough, which is a contradiction.
Note that V ￿
j .￿;m/ is continuous in ￿, hence 9￿0
j > ￿ j and K 2 N s.t. 8k >
K;8mi 2 M￿i,
V ￿
j
￿
￿0
j;mi
￿
￿ V ￿
j
￿
￿ j
￿
cnk
￿
;mi
￿
> ￿
￿
￿ j;￿0
j
￿
=2 .
Since limn!1 cnk D 0, we can choose k large enough such that
cnk <
￿
￿
￿ j;￿0
j
￿
2 ￿
￿
h
￿
￿0
j
￿
￿ h
￿
￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿￿ .
Thus we have 8mi 2 M￿i,
V ￿
j
￿
￿0
j;mi
￿
￿ cnk ￿ h
￿
￿0
j
￿
> V ￿
j
￿
￿ j
￿
cnk
￿
;mi
￿
￿ cnk ￿ h
￿
￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿
;
which contradicts the assumption that ￿ j
￿
cnk
￿
is player j’s equilibrium response in
G
￿
cnk
￿
. Therefore we prove limn!1 ￿ j .cn/ D 1.62 MONTH YEAR
Step 4: Finally we derive a contradiction to complete the proof. Since 8n;￿i .cn/ 2
￿
0;￿i
￿
, there exists a ￿￿
i 2
￿
0;￿i
￿
and a subsequence
￿
cnk
￿1
kD1 ￿ fcng1
nD1 s.t.
lim
k!1
￿i
￿
cnk
￿
D ￿￿
i .
Let mi
￿
￿;￿i .c/
￿
characterize player i’s equilibrium strategy in G .c/. 8k 2 N; 8￿ 2 2,
we have
mi
￿
￿;￿i
￿
cnk
￿￿
D
Z
xi
2
6
4
￿
￿i
￿
cnk
￿￿1=2 ￿ f
￿￿
￿i
￿
cnk
￿￿1=2 .xi ￿ ￿/
￿
￿1nR
￿0.￿0￿r￿.1￿m j.￿0;￿ j.cnk////￿
￿
￿i.cnk/
￿1=2 f
￿￿
￿i.cnk/
￿1=2.xi￿￿0/
￿
p.￿0/d￿0>0
o
3
7
5 ￿ dxi
and
m j
￿
￿;￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿
D
Z
x j
2
6
4
￿
￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿1=2 ￿ f
￿￿
￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿1=2 ￿
x j ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿1nR
￿0.￿0￿r￿.1￿mi.￿0;￿i.cnk////￿
￿
￿ j.cnk/
￿1=2 f
￿￿
￿ j.cnk/
￿1=2.x j￿￿0/
￿
p.￿0/d￿0>0
o
3
7
5 ￿ dx j:
Since ￿ is a complete functional space and mi
￿
￿;￿i
￿
is continuous in ￿i, i 2 f1;2g,
there exists
￿
m￿
i .￿/;m￿
j .￿/
￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ such that
lim
k!1
￿
mi
￿
￿;￿i
￿
cnk
￿￿
;m j
￿
￿;￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿￿
D
￿
m￿
i .￿/;m￿
j .￿/
￿
.
Especially, as a result of Step 3, 8￿ 2 2,
m￿
j .￿/ D 1f￿￿r￿.1￿m￿
i .￿//>0g
and
m￿
i .￿/ D
Z
xi
￿
￿1=2
i ￿ f
￿
￿
￿1=2
i .xi ￿ ￿/
￿
￿1nR
￿0
￿
￿0￿r￿
￿
1￿m￿
j.￿/
￿￿
￿￿
￿1=2
i f
￿
￿
￿1=2
i .xi￿￿0/
￿
p.￿0/d￿0>0
o￿dxi:VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATION WITH RATIONAL INATTENTION 63
Choose a sequence
￿
￿0
i;nk
￿1
kD1 such that
lim
k!1
￿0
i;nk D 1
and
lim
k!1
cnk ￿ h
￿
￿0
i;nk
￿
D 0 .
Then
lim
k!1
8
<
:
￿
V ￿
i
￿
￿i
￿
cnk
￿
;m j
￿
￿;￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿￿
￿ cnk ￿ h
￿
￿i
￿
cnk
￿￿￿
￿
￿
V ￿
i
￿
￿0
i;nk;m j
￿
￿;￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿￿
￿ cnk ￿ h
￿
￿0
i;nk
￿￿
9
=
;
D
￿
V ￿
i
￿
￿￿
i ;m￿
j
￿
￿ 0
￿
￿
￿
V ￿￿
i
￿
m￿
j
￿
￿ 0
￿
< 0;
where the last inequality follows (C15). Therefore, for k 2 N large enough,
V ￿
i
￿
￿i
￿
cnk
￿
;m j
￿
￿;￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿￿
￿cnk￿h
￿
￿i
￿
cnk
￿￿
< V ￿
i
￿
￿0
i;nk;m j
￿
￿;￿ j
￿
cnk
￿￿￿
￿cnk￿h
￿
￿0
i;nk
￿
;
which contradicts to the assumption that ￿i
￿
cnk
￿
is player i’s equilibrium response in
G
￿
cnk
￿
.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3.
PROOF:
The proof is a direct application of Proposition 2.2 in Morris and Shin (2003) together
with Proposition 5. According to Proposition 2.2 of Morris and Shin (2003), 8￿ > 0,
9￿ > 0, such that the above statement holds for all ￿ > ￿. Then Proposition 5 shows
there exists c > 0 such that the players acquire information of precision at least ￿.
APPENDIX D
Proof of Proposition 6.
PROOF:
According to Proposition 8 and 9 in Appendix B, both "always invest" (i.e., m .￿/ D 164 MONTH YEAR
almost surely) and "never invest" (i.e., m .￿/ D 0 almost surely) are equilibria. By the
way, there may also exist "intermediate" equilibria with information acquisition. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4.
PROOF:
First note that
lim
￿!1
￿1=2p
￿
￿1=2 .￿ ￿ y/
￿
D ￿ .￿ ￿ y/ ,
where ￿ .￿/ is the Dirac delta function. Thus
lim
￿!1
Z
2
e￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿1=2p
￿
￿1=2 .￿ ￿ y/
￿
d￿
D
Z
2
e￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ y/d￿
D e￿￿￿1y
< 1 ,
where the inequality follows the condition y 2 .0;r/. Since
Z
2
e￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿1=2p
￿
￿1=2 .￿ ￿ y/
￿
d￿
is continuous in ￿, there exists ￿1 > 0 such that for all ￿ > ￿1,
Z
2
e￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿1=2p
￿
￿1=2 .￿ ￿ y/
￿
d￿ < 1 .
By a symmetric argument, we can ￿nd a ￿2 > 0 such that for all ￿ > ￿2,
Z
2
e￿￿1.￿￿r/ ￿ ￿1=2p
￿
￿1=2 .￿ ￿ y/
￿
d￿ < 1 .
Let ￿ D max
￿
￿1;￿2
￿
, then according to Proposition 6, the game has multiple equilibria
for all ￿ > ￿.
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PROOF:
We consider a special class of equilibria with the following form
m .￿/ D
8
<
:
m1 if ￿ ￿ m￿
m0 if ￿ > m￿
,
where m0;m1 2 .0;1/, m0 < m1, m￿ D ￿ ￿ m0 C .1 ￿ ￿/ ￿ m1 and ￿ 2 [0;1].
Given pI 2 .0;1/, (19) and (20) imply that
m1 .pI/ D
pI
1￿pI
pI
1￿pI C e￿￿￿1
and
m0 .pI/ D
pI
1￿pI
pI
1￿pI C e￿￿1 .
Let
g .pI/ D
1
1 C 2A
[m1 ￿ .m￿ C A/ C m0 ￿ .1 C A ￿ m￿/].
If
g .pI/ D pI ,
according to (19), (20) and (21), m1 .pI/, m0 .pI/,
SI D
￿
￿A;￿ ￿ m0 .pI/ C .1 ￿ ￿/ ￿ m1 .pI/
￿
and
SN D .￿ ￿ m0 .pI/ C .1 ￿ ￿/ ￿ m1 .pI/;1 C A]
constitute an equilibrium. Now we prove g .pI/ has an ￿xed point in .0;1/ for any
￿ 2 [0;1].
Step 1. We show
g .pI/ < pI
for pI close to 1.66 MONTH YEAR
Since m￿ ￿ 1,
g .pI/ D
1
1 C 2A
￿
m1 .pI/ ￿ .m￿ C A/ C m0 .pI/ ￿ .1 C A ￿ m￿/
￿
￿
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿ m1 .pI/ C
A
1 C 2A
￿ m0 .pI/ .
Thus it suf￿ces to show
(D1)
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿ m1 .pI/ C
A
1 C 2A
￿ m0 .pI/ < pI
for pI close to 1. Let
w D
1
1 ￿ pI
,
v0 D e￿￿￿1
￿ 1
and
v1 D e￿￿1
￿ 1 ,
then (D1) can be rewritten as
(D2)
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿
w ￿ 1
w C v0
C
A
1 C 2A
￿
w ￿ 1
w C v1
<
w ￿ 1
w
.
Since pI 2 .0;1/, w ￿ 1 > 0 and (D2) is equivalent to
(D3)
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿
1
1 C v0=w
C
A
1 C 2A
￿
1
1 C v1=w
< 1 .
It suf￿ces to show (D3) for w large enough.
Choosing w large enough such that
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and multiplying both sides of (D3) with .1 C v0=w/.1 C v1=w/ lead to
1 C
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿ v1=w C
A
1 C 2A
￿ v0=w < 1 C v1=w C v0=w C
v0v1
w2 ,
i.e.,
(D4) ￿
v0v1
w
<
A
1 C 2A
￿ v1 C
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿ v0 .
Note that (17) implies
A
1 C 2A
￿ v1 C
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿ v0 > 0 .
Hence, we can choose w large enough such that (D4) holds. Therefore, let
pI D
w ￿ 1
w
,
we have
g
￿
pI
￿
< pI .
Step 2. We show
g .pI/ > pI
for pI close to 0.
Since m￿ ￿ 0,
g .pI/ D
1
1 C 2A
￿
m1 .pI/ ￿ .m￿ C A/ C m0 .pI/ ￿ .1 C A ￿ m￿/
￿
￿
A
1 C 2A
￿ m1 .pI/ C
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿ m0 .pI/ .
Thus it suf￿ces to show
A
1 C 2A
￿ m1 .pI/ C
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿ m0 .pI/ > pI ,68 MONTH YEAR
i.e.,
(D5)
A
1 C 2A
￿
￿
1 ￿ m1 .pI/
￿
C
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿
￿
1 ￿ m0 .pI/
￿
< 1 ￿ pI ,
for pI close to 0. Let
w D
1
pI
,
v0 D e￿￿￿1
￿ 1
and
v1 D e￿￿1
￿ 1 ,
then (D5) can be rewritten as
(D6)
A
1 C 2A
￿
w ￿ 1
w C v1
C
1 C A
1 C 2A
￿
w ￿ 1
w C v0
<
w ￿ 1
w
.
It suf￿ces to show (D6) for w large enough. Note that (D6) is the same as (D2), thus by
the same argument in Step 1, we can ￿nd a p
I close to 0 such that
g
￿
p
I
￿
> p
I .
Step 3. Since g .pI/ is continuous in pI, there must exist a p￿
I 2 .0;1/ such that
g
￿
p￿
I
￿
D p￿
I .
Thus we ￿nd an equilibrium for the given ￿. Since we can ￿nd an equilibrium for any
￿ 2 [0;1], there exist in￿nitely many equilibria. This concludes the proof.